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SEPTEMBER 1967

Prabuddha Bharata

OR

AWAKENED INDIA



By Karma, Jnana, Bhakti, and Yoga, by one or more or
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Vol. LXXII

SEPTEMBER 1967

No. 9



उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत

Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

—:0:—

LETTERS OF SWAMI SHIVANANDA

(128)

Sri Ramakrishna Math
Belur, Howrah
16 January 1923

Dear Sriman —,

I learnt all from your letter. It is sure that the more you look on Him as your own, the more He will accept you as His own. Verily He will reveal Himself unto you quite in keeping with the mode of your thought and pattern of your desire. There is no doubt about it. I bless you heartily so that you may attain to blessedness with your heart's desire fulfilled. And it will certainly come to be true. You have taken refuge in Sri Ramakrishna who is the kindest of all, who redeems the lowly, who reinstalls the religion and is the incarnation of God. Know it for certain that this could happen to you only as a result of the accumulated virtues of your past.

I am very much delighted to learn that you observed Swamiji's birth anniversary amidst all rejoicings and fed many poor people (*daridranārāyaṇa*) on the occasion. Nowadays no government officer objects to any lecturing on the Master or Swamiji. Probably the person there is new. In any way, I think there will be no difficulty in future. Inspire the boys to good work and convey my heartfelt love and blessings to them. My heartfelt love and blessings to you. Through Master's grace all are well in the Math.

Your well-wisher,
Shivananda

(129)

Sri Ramakrishna Math
Belur, Howrah
26 June 1923

Dear Sriman —,

Received your letter and learnt all. I am very much delighted to know that you have shifted to the new building and have installed the Master there through regular ceremonial worship.

The Master Himself will accept the responsibility of those boys who devote themselves to spiritual practices, study and His work and of those who have the spirit of renunciation in them. I believe He has accepted them already. You have asked me to accept the responsibility of their future but to me the Master is my every thing and all. Never could I assume the role of a *guru* and never is there any possibility for this. Because I am the servant of His servant. How can I play the role of a *guru*? Always I am a disciple—always a servant. The Master is my all. Of course, the Master Himself will accept the responsibility of those who are devoted to us. There is no doubt about this.

All these that you have written to me out of devotion are but the attributes of the Master. All those apply to Him. It is He who has incarnated Himself in Ramakrishna name and form for the redemption of this world. Only to proclaim this message before the world we have been left here. To the men we tell and will always be telling, 'The Lord has incarnated Himself in the form of Ramakrishna. You all take refuge in Him, chant His holy name, sing in His praise and read His life. Read the life of Swami Vivekananda in whom He has His special manifestation. Do your might to perform His work—the work that pleases Him most. This will verily lead you to blessedness. No more will there be any fear to cross the ocean of life.'

I do not deserve what you write about me. All these go to the Master. I am His servant—His child. He has left me or us over here so that His message may be proclaimed before the world. Only this much is there and nothing else. The work that you are doing is the desired work of the Master and Swamiji. I do say with certainty that this will bring good to many including you all. Take Master's name, meditate on Him and earnestly pray to Him. By this you will be pure and you will make many others pure. The verse that you have quoted in the end is excellent. Verily the world is like this. Any one who can grasp this idea will have no more any attachment for this world. One, however, will have to do good work, selfless work so long one lives in this world. You have taken refuge in the Lord. So what fear is there for you? Sing His praises in joy, meditate on Him and do His work according to your might. The life will be blessed.

Have my heartfelt love and blessings and convey the same to the boys also.

Your well-wisher,
Shivananda

PRACTICE OF ASCETIC AUSTERITIES

[EDITORIAL]

Austerity as part of Religious Life: Human mind is, as Sabatier remarks, 'incurably religious'. Of all the motives that minister its ruling passion and guiding impulse, religion has been the inalienable concern. This religious enthusiasm, so grounded in the human nature, has given rise to the various forms of philosophies and religious beliefs imparting fresh impetus to the desire for the adventures of religious life and explains in a general way the ascetic tendencies that lead to the practices of the bitter austerities and severe hardships by the seekers of spiritual truth in every religion. To achieve the freedom of the soul by deepening their disgust with the world they have tried to shatter the fetters of custom, fled from the hurrying noise and maddening tumult around and retired to the vast solitudes of lonely mountains, honey-combed with dens and caves, arid valleys and dreadful forests where they could embrace with eagerness the tranquil but exciting disciplines of spiritual seclusion. To control the senses, to subdue the mind, to overcome pride—these were their objects, in order to accomplish which they plunged themselves in every possible form of rigorous self-denial and severe isolation. The idea that purity of the mind and fellowship of God are in some way associated with the practices of austerities, has always been held by all the religions of the world. With this end remaining the same, the methods and means have however differed widely from land to land and religion to religion. While all have united in a craving for holiness by a participation in a divine nature, they have diverged widely from one another in their opinions as to the nature of this holiness and as to the means by which it may be

achieved. Thus the connotations of austerities appear to be different according to the different traditions running through the beliefs of different religions.

Traditions of ascetic practices in different Religions: Austerity to the Christian tradition means 'mortification' or 'penance'. It is the life of self-extinction and is based on the vows of chastity and poverty as taught by Christ. A life of poverty is the indispensable precondition of true holiness, for John said, 'Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him.' The apostle of James cries to the men of wealth: 'Go to now, ye rich men, weep and howl for your miseries that shall come upon you.' Pauper Lazarus has been portrayed as participating in the joys of heaven while rich Dives as enduring the torments of the lost. So riches, sense-pleasures and self-will have come to be regarded as forms of sinful gratification from which one must remain away in every respect. It is not mere temperance or mental discrimination but positive austerities, not mere self-restraint but self-mortification that one is to practise. Following up these commandments of spiritual discipline, devout souls macerated their bodies, wore rugs, cut off hair, practised fasts and took to the life of begging friars and homeless mendicants. The poet voices the true yearnings of these souls when he writes:

O for a lodge in some vast wilderness
Some boundless contiguity of shade,
Where rumour of oppression and deceit,
Of unsuccessful or successful war
Might never reach me more.

And the historian speaks in the same vein as he makes his observation on this life of stern asceticism:

'Each proselyte who entered the gates of a monastery was persuaded that he trod the steep and thorny path of eternal happiness.' (Gibbon)

History of the days of the early Christianity is replete with the instances of severe austerities that were practised by the saints and ascetics of the time. St. Anthony is said to be one who lived in a tomb in company with the silent dead and later on for twenty years in a deserted castle, full of reptiles, never going out and rarely seeing any one. Once, at the earnest entreaty of the city Magistrates, he came down from his mountain cave. On being urged to extend his stay with them he said, 'Fishes, if they lie on the dry land die ; so monks who stay with you lose their strength. As the fishes, then, hasten to the sea, so must we to the mountains.' Saint Simeon Stylites earned his epithet the 'Pillar Saint' because of his austere spiritual practices. On a high column which was sixty-four feet in height, the saint lived and had his practices of spiritual disciplines braving the heat and cold for thirty years. Cenobite hermits used to crawl from their dens every day to hear the words of their chief saint—a practice that was part of their spiritual discipline. Saint Benedict practised great austerity by retiring to a sunless cave in the desert of Subiaco about forty miles from Rome. The cave was so inaccessible that he had to be given food by a rope to which was fastened a bell to call him from his devotions.

There are also the instances where self-mortification and penance were practised in their extreme forms. Hermits in quest of self-purification would carry eighty to one hundred and fifty pounds of weights suspended from their bodies, sleep standing against the rocks and not have their wash even for fifty years. Some would not even use water to drink but quench their thirst with the dew that fell on the grass. They were un-

compromising in their vows and relentless in their pursuits of austere spiritual life. Whatever might have been the excesses and extremes in this respect the motives that inspired men to voluntarily hazard their lives, were pure and sincere. 'Conscience', writes George Waddington in his *History of the Church*, 'however misguided, cannot be despised by a reflecting mind. When it leads one to self-sacrifice and moral fortitude we cannot but admire his spirit, while we condemn his sagacity and method.' There are records of ascetic practices that were in currency in the East and the West long before the advent of Christ. Dhaquit, a Chaldean ascetic who lived about 2,000 B.C. once rebuked those who tried to preserve body from decay by artificial means. 'Not by natural means', he said, 'can man preserve his body from corruption and dissolution after death, but only through good deeds, religious exercises and offering of sacrifices,—by invoking the gods by their great and beautiful names, by prayers during the night, and fasts during the day.' (*Vide*, A. W. Wishart: *Monks and Monasteries*, Trenton, U.S.A., 1900, Chapters I and III)

Spitama, the Prophet of Zoroastrianism renounced all worldly pleasures at the age of fifteen and retired into solitude and practised austerities for fifteen strenuous years.

Islamic doctrines prescribe a number of austere ordinances which are to be followed by every sincere aspirant of Allah. One must pray at five fixed intervals during the day and night ; fast during the month of *Ramadhān* every year from sun-rise to sunset ; contribute one fortieth of his income for the benefit of the poor ; and make the *haj* pilgrimage at least once in his life time. 'Prayers', according to the great Muslim mystic Gazālī, 'have three veils, whereof the first is prayers uttered only by the tongue ; the second is when the mind,

by hard endeavour and by firmest resolve, reaches a point at which, being untroubled by evil suggestions, it is able to concentrate itself on divine matters; the third veil is when the mind can, with difficulty, be diverted from dwelling on divine matter.' (*Vide*, Ikbāl Ali Shah: *Oriental Caravan*, Denis Archer, London, 1933, p. 77)

Ascetic austerity, according to the Hindu traditions, conveys a connotation which has a deep as well as comprehensive bearing in its outlook on spiritual pursuits. It is not merely negative self-mortification but also the cultivation of a positive spiritual insight with which a person achieves a spiritual rebirth and becomes a *ṛṣi*, a direct seer of truth. In commenting on the *Ṛg-Veda* (X. 98) Yāska defines the term *ṛṣi* as a person who is possessed of vision, to whom, practising austerities (*tapasyamānam*), the self-born Brahman manifested Itself. It has been described as *tapas*, a terminology that includes within it the concepts of both the end and the means of spiritual life. In the *Ṛg-Veda* this *tapas* has been looked upon as the radiance of light coming from the supreme illumination (*tapah uttamam mahah*). The *Śvetāśvatara* (I. 15) says that Self is realized within the Self when one looks to It by *tapas* (*satyenainam tapasā yo' nupaśyati*). The Sage of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* repeatedly asks his disciple to regard *tapas* as the veritable Brahman Itself (*tapo Brahmeti*). That he again and again tries to drive home the great importance of the *tapas* becomes evident from the verses as: '*tapasca svādhyāyapra-
cane ca* ... control of the inner organs and learning and teaching are to be resorted to'; '*tapā iti Taponityah Pauruṣiṣṭih*-austerity is the thing—this is what Taponitya, son of Puruṣiṣṭi, thinks.' Furthermore, as the *Ṛg-Veda* notes, *ṛta* and *satya* are the two concepts that were first created out of

the *tapas* at the dawn of cosmic creation. So *tapas* permeates each and every grain of this universe.

Tapas is the only means to the attainment of supreme knowledge. The verse of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (III. i. 5) elaborates the statement, '*satyena labhyaḥ tapasā hi eṣa Ātmā* the bright and pure Self within the body is attainable verily through *tapas*.' In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (IV. iv. 22) we read 'Brāhmaṇas seek to know Him by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting and he who knows Him becomes a *muni*. Wishing for that world of Brahman only, mendicants leave their homes.' *Chāndogya* (II. xxiii. 1) prescribes three branches of religious duties: Sacrifice, study and gifts -- these are the first. Austerity alone is the second and the celibate student of sacred knowledge who lives in the house of the teacher throughout his life mortifying his body in the teacher's house is the third. All these become possessors of meritorious worlds; but one who is established firmly in Brahman attains immortality. *Praśna* (I. 2) insists on the practice of penance (*tapas*), abstinence (*brahmacarya*) and faith (*śraddhā*). *Kaṭha* (II. 15) refers to the practices of *tapas* and *brahmacarya*. Thus almost all the Upaniṣads emphasize the need of asceticism and practice of austerities in all the stages of life.

The *Ṛg-Vedic* texts (X. cliv. 2) signify austerities as *kṛccha*, *mahat* (penance of the highest order) and other forms of sacrifices by the merit of which one attains heaven. But, viewed in the light of all the Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts in their entirety, they mean an integrated scheme of inner and outer spiritual disciplines. They include both physical and mental austerities through the practices of which the learner's mind gradually becomes *śānta* (calm and unperturbed), *dānta*

(self-restrained), *uparata* (self-denying) *titikṣu* (patient) and *samāhita* (collected). Nearly all the Upaniṣads, therefore, ask for the practice of this *tapas* or austerities in all the stages of life. In the *Chāndogya* Prajāpati, the Creator asks Indra, the King of the gods to perform *tapas* for one hundred and one years when the latter approaches the former for the knowledge of the Self. In the same *Upaniṣad* (IV. X. 3) one finds Upakosala a student who having been quite exhausted with austerities and from mortification was not able to eat. The sage Varuṇa in the *Taittirīya* repeatedly asks his son Bṛgu, 'Crave to know Brahman by *tapas*.' In the *Maitrāyaṇa* there is the mention that 'without being an ascetic it is impossible either to attain the knowledge of Ātman or to bring work to fruition'. (R. K. Mookerji: *Ancient Indian Education*, 1951, Pages 23, 24, 96, 98 and 116)

Practice of austerities, as we have already mentioned, always aims at the inner transformation of a person and the fact becomes testified by a number of concrete examples from these Upaniṣads. In *Maitrāyaṇa* (I.2) King Bṛhadratha renounced his kingdom and practised severe austerities in the forest but he failed to realize the Self. The father of Śvetaketu in the *Chāndogya* (VI. i.6) finds his son conceited and arrogant, although the latter had studied all the Vedas and practised austerities for long twelve years at the teacher's house. Satyakāma Jābāla did not impart instruction to Upakosala Kāmalāyana, although the latter had tended the sacrificial fire of the former for twelve years. (ibid., IV. x. 2) Pravāhaṇa, approached by Āruṇī for supreme knowledge, asks him to practise austerities for some time. (ibid., V. iii. 7; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, VI. ii. 6)

Practice of austerities, according to the Hindu view, is the indispensable prerequisite to every branch of spiritual knowl-

edge. It is not self-annihilation but self-assertion, an active and positive purifying force that burns every evil, dispels all doubts and conquers new realms in earth and heaven for the human soul.

It will not be an overstatement to posit here that from out of the well integrated scheme of ascetic practices of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic traditions there arose the Buddhistic ordering of ascetic life with all its precepts of austerities and morals. 'Buddhism', writes Max Müller (*Chips from a German Workshop*, p. 438), 'achieved in one sense, the full realization of this Brāhmaṇic ideal.' Quite in conformity with Upaniṣadic traditions Buddhism too prescribes the observance of the three classes of *śīlas* or austerities—*kāyika* (physical), *vācasika* (verbal) and *mānasika* (mental) which form different steps in the path of spiritual progress of a person. These *śīlas* may be broadly classified into five subsections :

(i) *pātimokkhasaṃvarasīla* — enumerating two hundred and twenty-seven disciplinary rules of *pātimokkha* ;

(ii) *indriyasaṃvarasīla*—asking a monk to be restrained in his organs of sense ;

(iii) *ājīvapāriśuddhisīla*—detailing the austerities with regard to food ;

(iv) *paccayasannissitasīla*—enjoining rules for wearing robes, accepting alms for food, using seats and beds or seeking medicaments ;

(v) *dhutaṅgas*—or thirteen rigorous ascetic practices.

Purity, according to the Buddhist doctrines, is more mental than physical and hence the emphasis in Buddhistic thoughts has been laid more on mental austerities than on dry physical ascetic practices. In the earliest phases of Buddhism when Buddhist hermits used to live in caves, and forests, four *nissayas* or conditions were prescribed for them :

(i) *piṇḍiyālopa-bhojanam* (to take food received as alms);

(ii) *paṃsukūlacīvaram* (to use robes made of rags collected from the dust heap);

(iii) *rukkhamūlasenāsanam* (to sit and lie at the foot of a tree);

(iv) *pūtimuttābhesajjam* (to use excrements and urine as medicines).

The thirteen *dhutaṅgas* were thirteen severe practices which Devadatta, Buddha's cousin, wanted to introduce into the Order and to which Buddha was opposed. The practices are:

(i) *paṃsukūlikaṅgam* (to wear robes made of rags collected from the dust heaps of streets and cemeteries);

(ii) *tecīvarikaṅgam* (to have not more than three robes);

(iii) *piṇḍapātikaṅgam* (to eat food collected by begging from door to door);

(iv) *sapadānacārikaṅgam* (to beg food from house to house consecutively without any omission);

(v) *ekāsanikaṅgam* (to take meal at one sitting);

(vi) *pattapiṇḍikaṅgam* (to possess only one bowl and not a second and to take all kinds of food thrown into it);

(vii) *khalupacchābhattikaṅgam* (not to take any food after finishing one's meal);

(viii) *ārañṇikaṅgam* (to dwell only in forests which are far from the locality and not on the outskirts of the towns or villages);

(ix) *rukkhamūlikaṅgam* (to live in a place without any shade and under a tree);

(x) *abhokāsikaṅgam* (to live in an open space);

(xi) *sosānikaṅgam* (to live in a cemetery which has been left unused for at least twelve years);

(xii) *yathāsanthatikaṅgam* (to use whatever bed or seat is given to one without any question); and

(xiii) *nessajjikaṅgam* (to spend nights

sitting and not lying; of three *yāmas* one may be spent in walking).

One, however, was not required to observe all the thirteen *dhutaṅgas* and if any body practised the severer of them, he was not required to practice the less severe ones. (Dr. Nalinaksha Dutt: *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Vol. I, pp. 203–211)

Jainism emphasizes on both physical and mental practices of austerities. There is the ordering of a number of strict vows by the practices of which one will gradually qualify oneself for the complete ascetic life. The vows are:

(i) five *anuvratas*—*ahiṃsā*, *satya*, *asteya*, *brahmacarya* and *aparigraha*;

(ii) three *guṇavratas*—*dig-vrata* (laying down limits of distance beyond which one shall not travel), *deśa-vrata* (further limiting the distance for a specified period of time), *anarthadaṇḍa-vrata* (setting limits to one's belongings and occupations for a particular period of time);

(iii) four *śikṣāvratas*—*sāmāyika* (retiring to the forest or in any quiet place where one is to stand erect or squat on the ground and practise contemplation), *poṣadhōpavāsa* and *bhogopabhogaparimāṇa* (practising physical austerities by fasting once a week and restricting food on other days), *atithi-saṃvibhāga* (giving alms to the holy persons).

Through the observances of these vows, one will gradually attain to *samyak-cārita* (right conduct), *samyak-darśana* (right faith) and *samyak-jñāna* (right knowledge).

The outfit of a Jain ascetic, as Jacobi states, is to consist of clothes, a blanket, an alms bowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground and a piece of cloth to cover his mouth when speaking lest any insect should enter it. Monks of *Digambara* sect keep similar outfit. But they keep no clothes and use brooms of peacock's feathers or hairs of the tail of cow. The

monks practise very hard austerities. They shave their head or remove their hair by plucking it out. This getting rid of hair is one of the essential rites for the Jain monks. They sleep only three hours and devote the rest of the time in meditation, begging alms, study and in careful inspection of the clothes and other objects with them for the removal of insects. This practice of extreme *ahimsā*—carefulness not to hurt or kill any living being forms one of the keynotes of Jain ascetic austerities. (Dasgupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 172)

Synthesis of the different Views: Such is the tradition of ascetic spirit that has manifested itself in a great variety of ways and such have been the methods that were employed in the past to realize it. If this long history of ascetic austerities leaves us no gain, let us value it as a proof that the spirit of self-effort contributes to self-regeneration of the human soul which by new convictions of immortality, new ideas of perfection and new perceptions of lofty spiritual nature triumphs over all that the world hopes and over all that it fears. It is this self-regeneration that fortifies every noble principle, strengthens every ancient tradition and sustains every great religion. It is this self-regeneration that makes the difference between man and man and elevates a sinner to the dignity and possibility of a saint.

In the *R̥g-veda* (X. cix.4) there is the reference of seven ṛṣis absorbed in *tapas* and of the power of *tapas* in raising the lowest to the highest. All distinctions of caste and culture stand dissolved before this purifying force. The *R̥g-Veda Samhitā* preserves the names of several ṛṣis who were kings or Kṣatriyas. Vātsāyana says, 'He who has attained through proper means the direct realization of *dharma*, he alone can be a ṛṣi, even if he is a *mleccha* (untouchable) by birth.' Hindu tradi-

tion makes no distinction with one who has realized the truth. Thus the sage Vasiṣṭha was born of illegitimate union, Vyāsa was the son of a fisherwoman, Nārada, was the son of a maidservant with uncertain parentage. The sage Kavaśa Ailuśa was also born of a maidservant mother and Mahidāsa, the author of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* had a Śudra mother. Satyakāma Jābāla, Kṛpa, Droṇa and Karṇa were raised to the position of great distinction and glory in virtue of their superior knowledge or valour. Similar instances can also be appropriately cited from the pages of the history of other religions where the perfecting power of ascetic austerities has transformed the lives of many lowly born and worldly minded persons lifting them upwards with immortal hope and exalting self-regeneration by giving life and force to their latent powers and hidden potentialities.

A careful survey of the ascetic traditions compels the conclusion that practice of austerities, while it added much to the vitality of all the religions of the world, has not always been an unmixed blessing. It has, at times, bred selfishness and perversion even in the cloister of the cells and turned the solitude of the mountains and forests into narrow and dreamy asceticism of overdone fasting and magical resurrection. Instead of inculcating disciplined calm and freedom of thought it has developed spiritual pride, fostered heartlessness, engendered inhumane spirit and chilled every genuine emotion and natural sentiment in the human heart. 'Ambition, avarice, irresolution, fear and inordinate desires', writes Montaigne, 'do not leave us because we forsake our native country, they often follow us even to cloisters and philosophical schools; nor deserts, nor caves, nor hair shirts, nor fasts can disengage us from them.' Renunciation and discrimination are virtues which are the attitudes of the mind developed

out of the harmony of our inward nature. No observance of penance will be purposeful unless the same is directed towards this harmony and discrimination. So the *Bhagavad-Gītā* warns us against any excesses in *yoga* disciplines that may disturb the harmony of our life. Buddha too experienced the futility of all extremisms and prescribed the Middle Eightfold Path. And lastly all ascetic practices must be preceded by the love of God. It is out of

this love of God that one renounces the world and practises all austerities, and not the reverse. Without this love of God, as the Saint-Poet Kabir says, '*tīrath men to sab pāni hāi* i.e. there is nothing but water at the holy bathing places, the images are lifeless and the *Purāṇa* and *Korān* are mere words.' Therefore, this love of God is the quintessence of all *tapas*, *summum bonum* of all *yogas* and the end of the practices of all ascetic austerities.

NATURE OF DIFFERENCE

DR. P. S. SASTRI

The Absolute Reality being one, it implies the negation of difference. The concept of difference appears in five possible ways. Two entities may be said to be identical and yet different, as cause and effect. The second view is that one differs from the other, because of a difference in the nature of the ground. The third holds that the two have a relation of mutual negation. The fourth considers dissimilarity to be the difference. The fifth argues that difference is a distinct substance, because it is perceived.

Let us first begin with the view that difference constitutes the nature of the given. Is this concept related to such concepts as the given and its counterentity? Or is its perception determined by either? (*Tattvapradīpikā*, 166) A difference that is not related to the ground and its counterentity is illogical and contrary to experience. It may be held that difference is the inherent nature of an entity and that it is identical with the form of the entity. Then the concept of relation to the given and its counterentity is taken to be a determination arising from a prior cogni-

tion. But in actual fact the object experienced is only the complete entity, and not its difference. (*Sanṣkepa Śārīraka*, II. 104) Then the difference of a pot from every other entity is not identical with the pot or with the others. (Sadananda: *Advaita Brahma Siddhi*, 133) If this is not so, all entities will have just difference as their nature, and then all entities will be identical with one another.

The concept of difference is always related to the counterentity. Then if difference constitutes the nature of the entity, the counterentity must be present in the given. (*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, 112) Difference is a limited concept as it is limited by the concepts of the given and its counterentity; and the essential identity of difference with the given would establish its identity with the counterentity. (*Tattvapradīpikā*, 168) That is, the difference of pot from cloth is taken to be identical with the pot. Then the cloth too is identical with the difference. The counterentity cloth is then one with the pot.

If it be argued that the pot by implication or association suggests its difference

from the cloth, then we have only an indeterminate difference. But we cannot think of difference without getting at the counterentity of the given. If difference is the nature of the cloth, how is it denoted by a pot? The blueness of an object is not denoted by the greyness of another. (*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā*, 114) Difference has to be an entity other than the two, and yet it cannot be an entity. This is the queer but a perfectly logical position involving us in a series of difficulties. If the difference of the pot from the cloth qualifies the concept of the ground, pot, then the pot and its difference cannot be one. (*Tattvabodhinī*, 626) Then they must be different, in which case the difference stands in need of a difference.

Does perception reveal only difference, or the entities also? If it reveals the entities, does it reveal them as different separately or together? We cannot apprehend the difference in the absence of the apprehension of that which is the counterentity of the substratum. Then there can be no cognition of the entity as preceded by the cognition of difference. There cannot be a cognition of difference as preceded by a cognition of the entity, since the cognition does not function by fits and starts. The cognition cannot apprehend both the entity and its difference at the same time because the two being causally related, they cannot have a simultaneous existence. The cognition of difference is caused by the apprehension of the counterentity of the substratum. But this objection takes into consideration the view that difference is based on the form of the entity. (*Tattvapradīpikā*, 164)

The apprehension of the object may be said to be no other than the apprehension of the difference. If the nature of the object involves difference, its apprehension does not involve a reference to the counterentity. Moreover, do we apprehend the

difference or the given entity? If it is said that the object is apprehended as itself and also as other than something, we do not run away from the logical difficulties.

Two entities may be said to differ because of a difference in their attributes. Then the difference of one is dependent on the other. This involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. Thus A differs from B, because B differs from A. But the cognized differences involve the apprehension of the counterentity of the given substratum, and we do not say that only one is apprehended as different. (*ibid.*, 165) Each cognition, being one, cannot be a unity or a blend of two or more cognitions.

If we are not able to apprehend the difference between milk and water when they are mixed, it is because the mixing prevents the cognition of the difference. Likewise, should one explain the non-cognition of difference between the trees visible at a distance. (*ibid.*) This does not, however, amount to a denial or negation of difference, but an implicit acceptance of it.

Difference is not determined or qualified by the counterentity, but is just indicated. Then even if difference is of the nature of the substratum, it cannot have the nature of the counterentity which is not involved or subsumed in the substratum. The counterentity may not be subsumed in the nature of difference. But still just like the substratum, even the difference which is of the form of the given cannot be established with the aid of a counterentity. The pillar is the counterentity of the pot, and this is ascertained by its determinateness. This character of being a counterentity can be its form or its property. If it is the former, since it is determinate, it becomes one with the given. If the character of a counterentity is involved in the form of the pillar, the pot too will

appear as having the nature of the pillar. If it is only a property, even the pot will acquire the property of the pillar, because the pillar is characterized by the counter-entity which is qualified by the pot. (ibid., 167) Thus even a difference involving a property or quality does not solve the basic difficulty.

When the quality and the qualified are cognized by two different senses, they are related thus as successively cognized. Then first there will be the cognition of the counterentity of the substratum, and this has to be followed by the cognition of difference as qualified by the former. Hence the two cannot be apprehended together. (ibid., 169) Consequently the cognition of difference cannot be involved in the other apprehension. The relation between these two cognitions is again full of difficulties.

If difference and the different were to differ, there will be a regress. Difference is necessarily apprehended in a determinate way as this is different from that, or as this is the difference between the two; and the given is qualified by difference. Then without apprehending the prior difference, we cannot apprehend the subsequent difference. Here it is not possible to admit of multiple differences operating simultaneously. (ibid.) Difference by its very nature seems to unify the idea of succession, not of simultaneity. If there is to be a simultaneity, it offers two cognitions which at least have to be successive.

But Udayana has argued in defence of difference. We cannot deny the knowledge of difference because it is a fact of experience. If difference exists, it is either eternal or noneternal. If it is noneternal, it may be uncaused. If it is caused, it may have no object. If it has an object, the object may be liable to be contradicted. In deep sleep we are not aware of differ-

ence. If difference exists, it cannot be uncaused, since there are no uncaused entities. Since it is caused, it cannot be without an object. Then difference exists, it is caused, and it has a reference to an object. Does the knowledge of difference refer to the form of the object, to the mutual exclusion of the objects, to the different qualities of the objects, or to something else? The difference involving any of the first three varieties is liable to be negated or contradicted. Even then if difference is a specific property, the earlier difficulties of a regress will be present. A regress can make a something appear illogical; but it cannot invalidate a fact of experience. Mutual negation can involve the fallacy of mutual dependence, if it depends on the given entities. But this negation can be caused by a cause different from the given. Mutual negation is grounded in the cognition of difference. Here we assume a cause on the basis of the facts. It is not proper to reject the evidence of the facts on the basis of a cause. (*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā*, 1170-71) Actual experience seems to present difference as real. How can we then deny it?

The form of the entity is the object of the cognition of difference. Then how can we have a statement like, the pot is different? The pot and difference are not synonymous. If we accept difference, the expression is tautologous. But the expression is said to be intended only for the sake of convenience. (ibid., 1174-75) But the defect pointed out by Maṇḍana is true to facts, and the realist cannot easily brush it aside. Even for the sake of a convenience we do not express the identity of an entity by taking recourse to difference.

The pot is apprehended as having the nature of the pot, as negating the nature of the cloth, and also as having specific characteristics. All these three varieties of difference can be found together in some

cases. These three varieties are found in the cases of the substance, quality and action. The first two varieties alone are found in the cases of inherence, particularity and universal. The first variety alone is present in the case of nonbeing. (ibid., 1175-76)

This theory of the realist is not acceptable. Whatever approach is made to understand the concept of difference, the concept turns out to be inexplicable. The real trouble is not one of denying or affirming what is experienced. It is one of interpreting logically what *appears* to be a matter of experience.

In mutual negation, one depends on the other. The pot negates the cloth. The pot excludes the cloth because it is other than the cloth. The difference of the pot then depends on its being other than the cloth; and the difference of the cloth depends on its being other than the pot. If this negation does not involve the fallacy of mutual dependence, then take the cognition, 'the pot is not a cloth'. The cloth is the counterentity of the pot, and it is excluded. Then the pot too will have to be excluded, because the pot and the cognition are not identical. (Cf. *Citsukhī*, 170) Otherwise we will have to admit the fallacy of mutual dependence; and if experience involves this fallacy, it has every reason to be rejected as nonreal.

When I apprehend the difference between a pot and a cloth, it is because I apprehend the given. The two given entities form the ground of my apprehension of difference. Now is this apprehension of the ground an apprehension as a ground, or an apprehension of the form of the ground? In the first case, does it depend on mutual negation or on something else? Since there is the apprehension of mutual negation and of the ground, consider the cognition referring to a man holding a stick. I cognize the man and exclude the

stick, and I cognize the stick excluding the man. One negates the other. Then how do I cognize the ground, since the stick is grounded in the man? In every cognition of the qualified there is implicitly involved the cognition of the qualification. The entity is apprehended not as it is in itself, but as qualified. Then the difference between the man and the stick must enter into knowledge not as a difference but as a qualification; and thereby it would lose its alleged nature.

The presence of the counterentity does not reveal difference. Then even the memory of the counterentity cannot account for the difference, because the relation of memory to the counterentity and to the given will again involve us in insoluble difficulties. If the counterentity and even the memory are of no avail, there is no possibility of holding that difference is really cognized by an agent.

The two entities may be said to differ from one another because of a difference in their attributes. Now nonbeing has no attributes, and as such it cannot differ from the world of being. (*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, 1152) But being and non-being are not taken to be identical in real life. Consequently we cannot argue from the standpoint of the attributes.

If difference does not need a counterentity, then the cognition of a blue patch must reveal not merely blueness but difference from itself. Then to account for this internal differentiation we need another difference and so on. (ibid.) An infinite regress thus becomes unavoidable.

If difference does need a counterentity, we should know what differs from which. The given cannot differ from everything, because everything includes the given. If a pot is said to differ from a cloth and other things, the pot is limited by them. That which limits it can be another entity or a form. If it is another entity, it will

have to differ again from another, and that which limits it will be another entity or form. This is an unavoidable regress. If that which limits it is a form, then the pot too has a form, an identity. If the pot is denied a form or an identity, the question of difference cannot arise. (ibid., 1154) Difference seems to presuppose a form, an identity of the object with itself. The primacy of identity has to be accepted.

Pot and nonbeing too limit one another. Then the pot having a form and nonbeing having no form will have to differ from another. That is, the form of the one differentiates it from the formlessness of the other. It may be conceded that nonbeing has only one form. The pot and nonbeing exclude or contradict one another. The relation of mutual exclusion cannot constitute the form of nonbeing, since nonbeing cannot have more than one form. Moreover, the difference of one from the other does not mean the contradiction or negation of the one by the other. Contradiction or negation depends upon existents. (ibid., 1154-55) Otherwise nonbeing as the counterentity of the pot and the cloth, will bring about the oneness of the pot and the cloth. If this is not acceptable, then nonbeing cannot be valid. (*Citsukhī*, 171)

If difference is to be treated as an attribute, is the pot itself difference or is difference an attribute? In the former case the pot would imply a counterentity since difference depends on a counterentity. The pot does imply a reference to that which is not a pot, and it does this by revealing its difference. If the pot is apprehended as having a reference to the cloth, is it the pot that has this reference, or a property of the pot? If the pot has this reference, then it cannot be apprehended without having the reference to the cloth. Then the apprehension of the cloth would cause

the apprehension of the pot. And we do not have a trace of the apprehension of the cloth when we cognize the pot. Then the pot and the cloth cannot differ from one another. (*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā*, 1156-57)

If it is not the pot but the property of the pot that has a reference to the cloth, then the difference must be sought as the mutual apprehension which is different from the pot. This is again an unsatisfactory position.

The objects by themselves are different. Then whenever I have a cognition of a pot, I must also have the cognition of difference. The knowledge of the pot, it may be said, along with the knowledge of its counterentity constitutes the awareness of difference. Then I have two cognitions, one is of the pot and the other is that of its difference from its counterentity. If both these are real, the given pot must have a specific feature to give rise to the awareness of difference. This specific feature, and not the pot, will be the difference. Is this specific feature different or not? If it is different, there is a regress again; and if it is not, there will be identity with everything. (ibid., 1161)

Are the differences known successively or simultaneously? If the former, the cognitions of difference would be endless. If the latter, since the differences are similar, it is impossible to state that that is the difference between these and these; and the difference of one group can be then mistaken to be the difference of another group. (ibid., 1161-62) Succession and simultaneity are equally powerless concepts in this situation.

The pot is different because it is limited by the cloth. Likewise the cloth is different, because it too is limited by the pot. Then the difference of the one depends on the limitation imposed by the other. This fallacy

of mutual dependence is unavoidable. To avoid this fallacy, it may be said, the limit is not imposed by the other but by the form of the object. Then difference will characterize the nature of the object, and when we apprehend the form, are we not apprehending the limits of the object? (ibid., 1164) This argument would lead us to hold that finitude is the same as difference. But the realist would not take it up.

Is difference different from itself or identical with itself? If the former, there is the regress. If the latter, there is the negation of difference. (ibid., 1165) The very nature of difference is impossible of explication unless we reject it as unreal.

When milk is mixed with water, the difference is not cognized. It may be said that the mixing acts like a defect and prevents the cognition of difference. But if two entities are not apprehended as different, there is no cognition of the qualified and the quality. Then it is of no use to bring in an explanation to account for this noncognition of difference. (*Citsukhī*, 170) Any explanation can be considered only when there is the actual cognition of difference.

Nonbeing as the counterentity of pot does not differ from nonbeing which is the counterentity of the cloth. Then mutual negation cannot differ from relational negation. The pot is not in the cloth, and the cloth does not become the pot. Both ways the pot is the counterentity. Absolute negation cannot be defined as the nonbeing grounded in the counterentity, because this is also the character of mutual negation. If it be said that the absolute negation of B is the nonbeing grounded in B's own counterentity, even then it does not differ from mutual negation. When I say that the pot is not in the cloth, the counterentity of the absolute negation is the pot; and even the mutual

negation having the cloth as its counterentity is found in the pot. (ibid., 171-72)

Let us look at the nature of this counterentity. It may be argued that it is essentially a determinant. If the nature of the counterentity is a determinant, the substratum too would become a counterentity. If the counterentity cannot be said to be a determinant only when it is other than the substratum, then the character of being other than the substratum refers to the mutual negation having the substratum as its counterentity; and since we are not able to ascertain the independent status of the counterentity, there will be the fallacy of mutual dependence. (ibid., 172)

The next view is that difference is the mutual negation of the given and its counterentity. When we say that the pot differs from the cloth, what is meant by the counterpositiveness of jar? Is it the actual nature or quality of the pot? If it is the actual nature, the ground of difference which is the cloth becomes identical with the pot; for, the cloth as the locus is included in the nature of the counterentity. If it is the quality, we are not free from troubles. The cloth as the ground or locus is related to the essential character of the counterentity; and it would have also to be the quality of the pot. If the term cloth denotes the counterentity pot, and the term 'pot' denotes the counterentity cloth, there is mutual dependence. No relation is possible between the ground and its quality. (*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, 115) Relation as such is self-contradictory, and what we consider as relation is only an appearance. It cannot claim to be real.

Difference is of the nature of separateness; and if it is identical with the given, the given would have a dual character. (*Nṛsimhāśrama : Tattvabodhinī*, 624) This character will again be inexplicable. And a separateness cannot be identical even if

it is with the given, because such a separateness is really an identity.

Mutual negation implies that one is relative to the other. The relative can never be the real nature of a thing. (*Saṅkṣepa Śārīraka*, II. 105) The unconditioned substance and the relative difference can have no identity. If difference is the nature of an entity, we must be able to perceive correctly always, and there is no room for any error. (*Citsukhī*, 169) This unfortunately is not true. We are, therefore, led to argue that difference can only be other than the nature of the given.

The idea of difference is relative to the given and its counterentity. How do we perceive difference? (*Sadananda: Advaita Brahma Siddhi*, 130) Do we have in succession the perceptions of the given, its counterentity, and the difference between them? Or do we have them simultaneously? In the first alternative, which one is perceived first? The perception of the difference may be treated as the effect of the perceptions of the given and its counterentity. But there are perceptions where we know the essential characters of the two entities, and yet do not have a knowledge of their difference. When milk and water are combined, their difference is not perceptible. Here the knowledge of the given and of its counterentity has not given rise to the cognition of their difference. Since the perception of difference presupposes the perceptions of the given and its counterentity, these perceptions cannot be simultaneous. Thus we need a causal relation to explain difference, and we need difference to explain the perceptions. This involves the fallacy of interdependence. (*Citsukhī*, 170-71)

The two perceptions may be related as quality to the qualified. Or the perception of the given, its counterentity, and their difference may be deemed to be unrelated to one another. These alterna-

tives are of no avail, since the knowledge of difference presupposes the prior existence and awareness of the given and its counterentity. They do not coexist. (*ibid.*, II. 2)

If difference is a quality, is it identical with the given or not? If it is identical, we cannot say that difference is different from the given. If it is not identical, it lands us in a regress. Is difference different from the given by virtue of its own existence, or by virtue of a second difference? The first would imply that the causality of an event is innate. Then the second alternative remains: difference is different from its ground, because of another relation of difference. A third difference would be needed to establish this difference, and the process goes on in an endless sequence. The relation of difference to the given is inexplicable and as such the concept of difference cannot have an ontological reference or status.

The concept of mutual negation depends on the idea of separateness which is related to the given and its counterentity. Separation means that the two entities are two distinct entities which are mutually exclusive. That is, mutual negation depends on separation, and separation depends on mutual negation. (*Saṅkṣepa Śārīraka*, II. 106) This is a fallacy of interdependence, which fallacy seems to follow us wherever we turn in our effort to understand the concept.

How can we distinguish mutual negation from absolute negation when the two have the same counterentity? The pot is denied in the cloth. The difference of the pot from the cloth is mutual. At the same time the cloth also presents in it the absolute negation of the pot. If difference is the same as mutual negation, it must also be the same as absolute negation. (*Citsukhī*, 173)

Moreover, the separation of the cloth

from the pot would require another separation in order to get itself established. There is thus the regress again (*ibid.*, 174) Then mutual negation appears to merge in absolute negation; and the two forms do not appear to have any logical status as far as the concept of difference is concerned.

The cognition of difference always has the apprehension of both the given and the counterentity of the given. (*Advaita Siddhi*, 795) When we say that the pot is not a vase, we have two ideas with reference to the same ground; and these are related through a denial which too is experienced as referring to the same given. If difference is real and identical with the given, we should have to maintain the presence of the vase in the pot.

If difference is treated as an effect, we cannot forget that difference divides or separates the objects. Division or separation is related to what is divided or separated. (*ibid.*, 796) The pot, it may be said, is identical in nature with its difference. Then it has at least two parts. These parts are again different, because they are two; and again each part will have two parts in turn. This leads us to a regress. (*ibid.*) A pot has a large number of point-instants, which differ from one another. The difference in each has to be identical with the part which is treated as the ground or the given. Then each part must be capable of further and further subdivision endlessly. (*ibid.*, 795)

The relation of identity in difference makes out that each entity has a causal essence and the form of an effect. What may be the specific determinants of this relation between two given entities? Are they identical with the given, or different from them? The first alternative would make the determinants of identity and difference identical. Then the entities are either identical or different, and not

identical-and-different. If they are different, how are they related to the two given entities? There can be no substance-quality relation between entities which are identical or different. Then we have to say that the specific determinants which distinguish the identity and difference of objects are related to their respective grounds in such a way that they are both identical and different. (*Advaita Brahma Siddhi*, 137)

Inevitably we are forced to reject the validity of the concept of difference. It is not other than the given, and it is not even the same as the given. Difference cannot be identical with the form of the entity, for we should not then cognize a rope as a snake, or a pillar as a man. If we are not apprehending the form of the given, to which does this identity belong? (*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, 1141) It may be said that the trees in a forest exist apart from one another; and yet we speak of them as a forest. The forest is a whole which has the many trees as its various grounds. The trees however do not appear as an identity. There is no origination of a whole, though there is an apprehension of the whole. Each tree is identical only with itself, and the identity of the whole forest is only an assumed one, supervening a difference. (*ibid.*, 1141-42) An assumption is all that is possible, and assumptions cannot stand as logical arguments in support of any conclusion.

But I have known A and B as having a great similarity. Then I see only B and this may lead to the faulty recognition that this is A. I have assumed their identity, and this is the negation of their relation of similarity. The negation of identity thus comes out to be having its ground in their relation, and this relation is based on difference. But if I have assumed their similarity, I cannot assume a difference.

Difference which is relative and therefore conditioned cannot be identical with the ground which may be unconditioned. The unconditioned cannot be the conditioned and the relative. An entity cannot be both unconditioned and relative, because it is a violation of the law of identity and of the criterion of noncontradiction. If the conditioned and the unconditioned can

coexist, being and nonbeing too can coexist. When we negate something, the negation must have for its counterentity that whose existence is affirmed. The counterentity of the relative or conditioned entity is the absolute or the unconditioned. Since the concept of difference is a relative one, it cannot be identified with the nature of the ground. (*Advaita Siddhi*, 787-88)

THE RELIGION OF DEVOTION

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The human being having been born in this world finds himself in different environments. He has the longings of the flesh and the lust of action. The senses attract him and rivet him to the external objects. A life of pleasant sensations and unhindered gratification of his needs, desire and fancies keeps him going on without reflection. He finds life pleasant and an unqualified banquet. He does not look before or after and pines for nothing. He lives a free, impulsive, emotion-directed existence in a sense-bound world and responds to the call of Hedonism. The smart man speaks persuasively and lives a life of hectic activity, purse-proud and power-mad. He speaks the language of one who is omniscient and all-powerful. With excessive pride he displays his wealth, strength and employs them in the service of anti-social purposes and seeks endless satisfaction for his ever-increasing and never-satisfying desires. He dispenses with the eternal values e.g. Truth, purity and good conduct. He denies the existence of God and affirms the autonomy of man and declares after the poet, 'I am the master of my fate and the captain of my ship.' He cries aloud in the language of

the *Gītā* 'I am the Lord, I am the enjoyer, I am successful mighty and happy. This foe is slain by me and others also I shall slay, I am rich and well-born, who is there like me? I shall sacrifice, I shall give, I shall rejoice.' (XVI. 14-15) These atheists are not extinct today. Some of them are the men inebriated with the power which science and technology have endowed them. They go about menacing all with arrogance, conceit, anger and immense use of force and violence.

Such men find the going not very long smooth. They are upset by their failures and when they meet their better in their encounters. Life is not all a rose-bed. Human experience, when reflectively understood, discloses that there are birth, death, old age, disease and sorrow in human life. (*Gītā*, XIII. 8) Human life is transitory and is not all an unqualified pleasure garden. The transitoriness of life and the phenomena of death shake man's life to its depths. He asks the questions and seeks answers: Is the death the final victor? Is the grave the end of men? Is the coffin the last transport? Is man made in vain to be swallowed up in death? He realizes that human life is

not an end in itself. The author of the *Gītā* spells his imperative, 'Having entered this impermanent sorrowful world, do thou worship Me'. Devotion and surrender to the Lord are the only means to end the suffering incidental to unregenerate finite existence. This world is 'impermanent and sorrowful'. The imperatives of Kṛṣṇa in the *Gītā*, all revolve round the worship of the Lord. Established in the worship of the Lord, we are asked to go about our jobs in life. Theo-centric existence alone can save us from God-eclipsing activities. 'Therefore at all times remember Me only and fight, with mind and intellect fixed in Me.' (VIII. 7) It is the constant practice of living in the presence of God, that helps us to overcome the upsurges of the ego which takes legion forms and subtle hues distracting us from Truth. No amount of self-pride in the practice of self-control will avail. His grace is necessary. We must allow the Lord to take the reins of office and guide and direct us. To give a single example the individual must become like the paper kite where guiding string must be God. Without the guiding string the kite would flutter here and there and be completely lost. Hence, is the necessity to seek and dedicate all activities to Him. 'Whatever thou do, whatever thou eat, whatever thou offer in sacrifice, whatever austerity you practise, do it as an offering to Me.' This leads to *bhakti*, which grows with practice. The devotee must have a consciousness that is plastic and must unreservedly surrender it to the Lord. It must be a conscious act and not an involuntary mechanical movement. Life must be held out as an offering and sacrifice to the supreme. We must grow God-like in our consciousness. There must be no impulsion in us except the one planted by God in us. There must be a complete dynamic identification of our will with that of the Lord. There must be per-

fect self-naughting or ego-slaying i.e. 'the crucifixion must go before the resurrection'. We must die to our old self, that is the great renunciation is necessary. All traces of self-regarding desires and the feeling of agency must be extirpated. The objects of all acts must be *Īśvara-prīti* and the fulfilment of His work. The only reward that keeps the *bhakta* going is his joy that he is participating in Lord's work. This sense of participation is not the same as the independent worker's feeling. It is the sense of being an *instrument* of the great worker God. The outlook (*bhāvanā*) increases the intimacy and the identification grows with the dissolution of the ego. Then comes the stage when the *bhakta* feels that he does nothing on his own or for his pleasure. He feels that the Lord initiates, guides and sustains all our works. All works are to be dedicated to Him and looked up as His work. We are to be conscious joyful instruments of His action. All our powers are His; our life, mind and body are instruments for Him. We are the moulds for the manifestation of His glory and gospel. The *bhakta* does not look upon this dependence on the Lord as objectionable. It is the dependence on *One* who is all. It is not merely dependence, but is dependence and union in one. The consciousness of the devotee gets entrenched and anchored in the spirit. He escapes from ignorance into truth, from stress and tension into joy, intense *ānanda* and deep peace. The devotee sees that his ego lays down no condition, demands nothing and insists on no terms. He entertains no pride that he is the chosen instrument. Self-righteousness is the worst form of vanity and arrogance. It is the greatest hurdle to spiritual realization. The *bhakta* withholds nothing for his own use. His is a total surrender. 'Knowledge, power and glory are His and not mine', says the *bhakta*. The presence of the Lord percolates

his being at all the levels. He becomes established in God. As the devotee progresses he feels that all his thoughts, feelings, emotions are not his and are in essence the impulsion of the Lord. The God-consciousness, the presence of the Lord becomes natural and constant with him. The *Gītā* describes this phase of the *bhakta's* life in the fifteenth chapter. When the Lord takes complete possession of our self, the dross in us gets burnt up and our powers become angelic, and apprehension God-like, flawless, and luminous. He becomes divined and transformed. The *bhakta* has to completely surrender his self for achieving this transformation. All our nature must become plastic for His touch. You must hold back nothing from Him, for all the things we claim really belong to Him as the first verse of the *Īśā* declares. The *bhakta* becomes conscious in his life, mind, soul, body and heart that the very cells of his being are the Lord's. The devotee must stand aside and allow the Lord to function in him. There must be self-emptying before the Lord fills the soul. This is the simple law of spiritual displacement. The finite unregenerate intellect must cease to feel self-sufficient and give up questioning, doubting and disputing the claims of the Spirit. It must not obstruct, or oppose the claims of the Lord with its refractory desires, nor should it cling to its inertia and sloth and get entrenched in a life of sense pleasures so natural to the *tamas* in man. Once the Lord works in the devotee, he experiences wisdom and lift and sees harmony and beauty. The devotee is to be aware of his finiteness and the limitations of his powers. The natural earth-bound human mind is 'shut in the prison of half-lit obscurity, plodding mentality and petty self-confident knowledge'. It should give up its itch for putting forth its own wishes, desires and plans. The Lord works according to His plans. The *upāya-kauśala* is the

Lord's. He knows it. We cannot order it or time its onset. It is free and spontaneous. It is a law into itself. The essence of the attitude of the devotee is to give up his *ahamkāra*. The devotee must work hard and has no freedom from work but has only freedom in work. He does all his works in a spirit of service, for the good of the world (*lokasaṁgrahaḥ* and *sarva-bhūtahite ratāḥ*) and as devotion to the Lord. That is worship. The devotee encounters life, does not fly away from it, but fights it and does not compromise with evil. The devotee experiences the strength of the Lord. The Lord describes in the *Gītā* His attitude. The devotees with their minds and lives wholly absorbed in the Lord, ever speaking about the Lord are satisfied and delighted. To them who are steadfast, worshipful and loving to the Lord, the Lord gives knowledge (*buddhi-yoga*) by which they reach Him. The Lord says, 'out of mere compassion for them, I, dwelling within their self, destroy the darkness born of ignorance by the luminous lamp of knowledge.' Śaṅkara's remarks on this verse are highly instructive, significant and magnificently eloquent. The lamp of knowledge (*jñānadīpa*) is fed by the oil of pure devotion, fanned by the wind of meditation and has for its wick right intuition. The lamp is placed in the innermost recess of the heart where there is no taint of worldliness or sense-attraction. The efficacy of *bhakti* is unchallenged and devotion as a pure *sādhana* is glorified in all the scriptures of the world. The greatest hallmark of all devotion is the surrender of the self to the Lord's keeping. All worry is at an end when we have put ourselves in the hand of the best. That surrender to the Lord is the refrain of the *Gītā*. It is open to all and is within the reach of the average man. That is high road to God. Sri Ramakrishna clinches the issue: *yoga* in practice is linking

or uniting the mind with the Lord somehow or anyhow. *Bhakti* is the law of the Lord, surrender is its essence. 'It is beyond all creeds, dogmas, religious beliefs and personal aims of conduct. It is the crowning word and is not merely the essence of

what has been said on the subject in different scriptures. It sweeps all, breaks down every limit, brings down all barriers, rule, canon and formula and opens into a wide vivid and illuminating spiritual truth.

VIVEKANANDA THE WIT—1

DR. S. P. SEN GUPTA

'Why do you laugh so much?' asked an American, 'You are a monk'. Swami Vivekananda laughed and riposted, 'I am a monk, and, therefore, I can laugh. I am the child of immortal bliss. I have no guilty conscience'. Vivekananda was a wonderful philosopher, in whose life and message the serious and the light vein could co-exist peacefully. He gave the lie to the popular belief that monks should be like spectres with lean and hungry looks. 'Spiritual people', said this great spiritual leader, 'are not long-faced and thin. They are fat like me'.

Hundreds of writers have recorded their impressions about Vivekananda. And all of them have agreed that he was a great humorist, always full of quips and jests. Christopher Isherwood rightly comments on Swami Vivekananda's humour:

'The big lips and the line spreading from the wide nostrils have a curve of watchful humour, in which there is neither irony, nor bitterness, nor resignation—only a great calm, like the sea, with certainty dawning over it, an absolute, arising sun.' (*Prabuddha Bharata*, Golden Jubilee Number, 1945, p. 25)

The world, it has been said, is a comedy to those who think and a tragedy to those who feel. Who had a more feeling heart than Vivekananda? The great Vedāntist's

heart was as tender as that of a mother. His emotional sensibilities were revealed even to a superficial observer. And yet the world was not to him a tragedy. The world was not a blot or blank to him. It meant intensely, and it meant good. Humour, says Bergson, is the enemy of emotion. Vivekananda could bring about a wonderful synthesis of the head and the heart. Laughter with him rose invariably from a gaiety of disposition. Never a satirist, he had no contempt or indignation. Humour is always incompatible with contempt or indignation. If there is ridicule in one's speech or expression, the geniality is lost; the kindness is chilled by ridicule, and one imperceptibly slips into satire. True humour springs from love. And Vivekananda was love incarnate like his Master. A humorist is a philanthropist. He must have a great sensibility to be moved to pain and pleasure. He should be conscious of the varieties of temper of people around him. Nothing human is alien to him. He will readily sympathize with his fellow beings in their joy and sorrow, laughter and tears, longings and aspirations. 'The best humour', says Thackeray, 'is that which is flavoured throughout with tenderness and kindness.' Humour must be a kindly contemplation of life.

Dr. Johnson had his Boswell, who missed

nothing of his hero. Vivekananda had no Boswell. Sri Ramakrishna had his Mahendra Gupta, who in the five volumes of the *Gospels* recorded the inimitable words of the Master. The biographies of Vivekananda, admirably written as they are, have not the Boswellian touch. It is, therefore, quite an uphill task to salvage the innumerable gems of his speech. What we can do is to ransack his works and the existing biographies and record here the few witticisms and humorous speeches that we have had the fortune to discover. No chronological order in an account such as this can be maintained. When, however, our story will be complete, the conclusion will be irresistible that Vivekananda was the supreme child of Bliss, who loved every particle of dust of this earth, while never losing sight of the beatific vision. He laughed, and the world laughed with him.

While very young, Vivekananda was extremely ebullient in spirit. Full of gaiety and vitality, he had a restless spirit which manifested itself in practical humour. When monks visited his house, he used to give them lavishly whatever he would lay his hands on, much to the chagrin of his mother. That is why he was locked up whenever a monk would come to his house for alms. The boy undeterred, threw away everything inside the room through the ironbars of the window. The members of the house were teased, and that was the child's joy. He would often tease his elder sisters. They pursued him to give him a smack, and the child again got the upper hand. He sought shelter in the drain. The sisters, whatever be the provocation, would not like to touch the 'dirty' delinquent. Vivekananda would then smile, and at times making faces, said, 'Now get hold of me if you like!'

In Biswanath Dutta's chamber there could be seen a number of hubble-bubbles for the clients of different castes

and creeds. Vivekananda could not understand why different men should use different hubble-bubbles. One day when no body was about, he picked up each of the hubble-bubbles and tugged at it. 'What are you doing?' the father asked. 'I was experimenting', the boy replied, 'whether I would be an outcast'. It was the speech of almost an iconoclast who had come to eradicate all the evils of the moribund society.

A man-of-war, known as 'Sirapis' was lying in anchor at Calcutta. Hundreds and thousands of the people of Calcutta flocked at the jetty to have a look at it. Naren who was only a boy of eleven was asked by his pals to let them see the ship. One before boarding the ship must get a permit from the Officer-in-charge. People queued up with the applications in their hands. The Officer-in-charge went on issuing permits. As Naren was about to enter the room the porter looked and derisively dismissed him. 'The permit will not be issued to a child', he said with pontifical solemnity. Naren knew no defeats. He looked all around and, to his great joy, found a spiral at the corner. Surreptitiously he entered the room and presented his application along with others. The Officer-in-charge signed it, and the young victor stepped out with a triumphant smile. 'How did you get in?' the porter demanded. 'I know magic', blurted out Naren.

You laugh, and the world laughs with you. There are, however, exceptions. While Naren was reading in the Metropolitan School of Vidyasagar he had to pay dearly for the crime of laughing. A boy behaved in a way that provoked the laughter of the other boys. Laughter is infectious, and Naren also laughed. The teacher in high dudgeon boxed his ears so violently that he was profusely bleeding. Vidyasagar who did not consider laughter to be a crime, punished the offending teacher.

Naren often entertained his younger

brothers and sisters with stories. We have reasons to believe that the stories were not fabricated by him, but the humorous twists were certainly his contribution. Some of the stories that he used to narrate, may be summarized here:

An old woman had a goat. A wicked man stole it and feasted upon it. The old woman frantically searched for the goat, but to no purpose. She met the wicked man and enquired about it. He replied that the goat was turned into a man and had become a *kāzī* or a judge. The old woman went to the court and was delighted to find a close resemblance between the beard of the judge and the hair on the goat's chin. Both the judge and the goat were strikingly black in complexion. Thoroughly convinced that the judge was the goat, the old woman approached with the rope and began to call him. The judge was at a loss and asked his peon to explain the situation. The peon asked the old woman to explain what he believed to be her pranks. The old woman replied, 'Does not the judge remember his past life? Today he has assumed an exalted office, but all these days I have grazed him in the pasture, fed him with grams and nursed him with such tender solicitude. How ungrateful he is!' The judge was completely flabbergasted. The old woman then said that somebody had told her of the transformation. The judge realized that the old woman was duped by a spiv. He sent for the wicked man and severely punished him.

Another story Naren was never tired of narrating was about the frogs. Once the frogs had an expensive feast, and they were short of funds. They, therefore, went to the leader of the mosquitoes, who helped them liberally. The monsoons set in, and the mosquitoes told the leader of the frogs, 'Give us back our money'. The frog was on the spree. He dipped himself in water and replied, 'I owe you nothing'. The mosquitoes did not venture to go near the water and left

in utter disappointment. A snake suddenly appeared on the scene and began to swallow the frog, who then said, 'Take back the money.' The mosquitoes were happy at the nemesis. We have it on the testimony of Vivekananda's younger brother that he amused his brothers and sisters by the droning and humming like mosquitoes and croaking like the frogs.

Children are mostly restless. Naren was more restless than the average run of boys. 'Look here', he said to his admirer, E. T. Sturdy, 'I had since my childhood an irrepressible energy, which clamoured for an expression'. He would often make faces at his fellow-students. He laughed and everybody laughed. His wit and humour were a perpetual source of delight.

While a student of college, Naren had the same ebullience of spirit. He had *joie de vivre*, a lust for life. None of his fellow-students was as witty and humorous as he. A born leader among men, Naren would sometimes take his friends with him in a carriage. They were all huddled together, and yet their joy knew no bounds. Naren was never tired of telling them humorous stories, and the atmosphere was agog with laughter. Yet there was nothing indecent about it. The laughter had in it the gleam and freshness of the rising sun.

This love of life and joy is not incompatible with his spiritualism. Man is born in joy, and joy is his supreme goal. Like the puritans he never turned his back upon the manifold joys of life. He loved life, and that is why he could make the greatest renunciation. He never dismissed the world as a mere illusion. Sir Brajendra Nath Seal's pen-portrait of Vivekananda may serve to illustrate our point.

'When I first met Vivekananda in 1881 we were fellow-students... Undeniably a gifted youth, sociable, free and unconventional in manners, a sweet singer, the soul of social circles, a brilliant conversationalist,

somewhat bitter and caustic, piercing with the shafts of a keen wit the shows and mummeries of the world, sitting in the scorner's chair but hiding the tenderest of hearts under that garb of cynicism; altogether an inspired Bohemian but possessing what Bohemians lack, an iron will; somewhat peremptory and absolute, speaking with accents of authority and withal possessing a strange power of the eye which could hold his listeners in thrall'.

The vignette is hardly complete. But nevertheless it shows the mental stress and strain he was passing through before his memorable meeting with the Master. The picture presented here is that of a puritan, for he, as Sir Brajendra Nath pointed out, [was] 'somewhat bitter and caustic, piercing with the shafts of a keen wit the shows and mummeries of the world, sitting in the scorner's chair but hiding the tenderest of hearts'. Vivekananda was born with the tenderest of hearts. But his cynicism was only a temporary phase developed when he was a Brāhmo. His bitterness was only something momentary, which he completely shed as he came in touch with Sri Ramakrishna, the symbol of joy. Vivekananda's puritanical view of life was due partly to Brāhmo and partly Christian influence. Sri Ramakrishna brought a message unprecedented in the world's history. He hated the word 'sin'. He believed that joy is human heritage. Man has his weaknesses. But that is not the last word. Man can triumph over all his weakness, and the soul will shine in all its effulgence. Vivekananda heard a new message and henceforth he never condemned a man for his weakness. The puritan came out of his coterie and plunged in the deep sea of humanity. He had now the most human personality. A passage from the *Life of Swami Vivekananda* by his Eastern and Western Disciples (p. 152) may be pertinently quoted:

'There is laughter and sweet human

sentiment as well, for he enjoyed life and was filled with a joyous sense of humour and fun and light-heartedness. In his heart he was always the boy of Dakshineswar. But one never knew when some revelation of the supreme illumination of his thought and the great depth of his spirituality, some sudden transition from fun to spiritual illumination, from the heights of thought to the joyousness of laughter, would come. And yet he was always the monk, the prophet, the teacher. It was as if his soul was constantly with God, and his thought and love always in the service of man'.

It was his selfless love for man that flavoured his humour with tenderness and kindness. Sometimes his humour, particularly in his student days had a touch of mischief. For the boy in him was never dead. Peter Pan was always within him. Naren was appearing at the B.A. Examination from the General Assembly's Institution. Naren's friend, Haridas Chatterjee was not sent up, as he could not pay his fees. He was extremely miserable. Naren was moved to pity and sought to help him out of this predicament. Rajkumar Babu, the Head clerk of the College was authorized to exempt the fees of the poor students. Naren, who was on excellent terms with Rajkumar Babu, thought he would take up the matter with him and get Haridas's fees exempted. A man of varying moods, Rajkumar Babu flared up and said, 'I will not allow Haridas to take his examination unless he pays his fees'. Naren took it to heart. But he was not a man to yield so easily. Naren was loitering before a lane in the evening. Rajkumar Babu stealthily entered into the lane. Naren knew that he was going to a house of ill-fame, that was the resort of the drug-addicts. For a member of an educational institution that Rajkumar Babu was, it did not look well to be detected there. He understood Naren's game. He was now face

to face with Naren. 'Why are you here?' asked Rajkumar Babu. 'I am here', came the unequivocal reply from Naren, 'to get Haridas's fees exempted'. Rajkumar was at once amenable to reason.

Even amidst heated arguments Vivekananda could preserve his unfailing genial humour. But the sting was there at times. Once he travelled with two Englishmen in the same Railway Compartment. The Englishmen thought him to be an uneducated monk and cut indecent jokes at his expense. Vivekananda kept mum. As the train stopped at a station, he asked the station-master in English to give him a glass of water. The Englishmen were a little nonplussed and asked him, 'Why did you not say anything when we were cutting jokes at your expense?' Vivekananda replied, 'My friends, this is not the first time that I have seen fools'. This is humour with a sting added to it.

On another occasion Vivekananda was travelling with an occultist, who cared more for the ritual and magical side of religion than the spiritual. He, therefore, asked Vivekananda with a good deal of gusto, 'since you have travelled in the Himalayas, you must have seen many *Mahātmās* there, who can work miracles'. Vivekananda, highly amused, encouraged him to continue. He then told the occultist a number of stories about the miraculous powers of the *Mahātmās*. The occultist's eyes were big in wonder and he devoured the stories. Then he asked Vivekananda, 'well, Swamiji, I suppose you must have heard the *Mahātmās* speaking about the end of the present cycle (*yuga*)'. Vivekananda readily replied, 'Yes, they have predicted that the present cycle will soon come to an end, and the *Mahātmās* will usher in *satya yuga*'. The occultist was extremely happy to acquire so much knowledge, which he thought, he would soon broadcast to the world. He gave some food to Vivekananda, who was

very much in need of it. And after that Vivekananda sternly said to him, 'You are proud of your learning. But why are you so superstitious? Why do you believe in all these fantastic stories? Psychical powers are incompatible with real spiritualism'. The occultist was completely reformed.

In the *Gospels*, we have innumerable humorous speeches of Sri Ramakrishna. We only regret that Mahendranath Gupta left very scanty records of Narendranath's speeches. There must have been exchanges of repartees between the Master and disciple. It is now lost in the limbo. When the Master asked, 'Well Naren, suppose somebody speaks ill of you, what will you do?' 'I shall think', replied Naren, 'that the dogs are barking'. It is undoubtedly a fine piece of witticism. Somebody asked, 'Naren, what have you realized in life?' 'What do you understand about my spiritual attainments?' replied Naren, 'You belong to the servant class. You should massage my legs. Now arrange for my smoking'.

On another occasion Naren said solemnly to Chhota Gopal (one devotee), who was in deep meditation, 'Well Gopal, get my hubble-bubble ready. Meditation is not meant for you. It is your duty to serve the monks. Meditation follows service'. Naren spoke quietly, but the audience burst into laughter. Once Balaram Babu (a devotee of Sri Ramakrishna) sent some sweets to the young monks. Naren swallowed some and exclaimed in rapture, 'Blessed be Balaram'. One of the greatest monks of all times, Vivekananda never assumed pontifical solemnity, nor did he ever speak *ex cathedra*.

'Why do you wear saffron robes', asked somebody. Vivekananda replied, 'This is the robe of the poor. Should I wear white clothes the poor people will ask for alms. A beggar cannot help a beggar'. An undeniably true statement! Yet the rationale of wearing saffron robes is highly amusing.

Once Vivekananda was told of an old monk. He felt interested and went to him. The old monk flared up and condemned Vivekananda, yet the latter retained his composure and said, 'I seek some religious instruction from you'. A little propitiated, the old monk replied, 'I am no longer angry with you. Do you like to eat any thing?' Vivekananda very politely said, 'I don't need any food. What I need is some religious instruction'. The old monk flared up again, 'Get out. If you refuse to eat anything here, you must clear out'. Vivekananda had no other alternative but to go away. The man who had escorted him naturally feared that Vivekananda would be displeased with him. But the prince of humorists found something amusing even in the shabby treatment of the old monk. So long he had repressed

his laughter. When left alone, he began to laugh and told his escort, 'You must have taken me to a wonderful monk. He is anger personified'. And then he laughed and went on mimicking the words of the old monk, much to his escort's delight.

Singaravelu Mudalier, a professor of science came to see the Swami. Singaravelu claimed to be an atheist. He came to scoff and remained to pray. The atheist became a God-fearing man. For the rest of his life he remained one of the staunchest followers of Swami Vivekananda. Amused at his transformation, the Swami said jestingly, 'Caesar said, "I came, I saw, I conquered"'. But Kidi [for that was the name of endearment given by Swamiji] came, he saw, but—was conquered'.

HINDUISM

DR. (MRS.) ARUNA HALDAR

The expression Hindu or Indus appears to have a connexion with the great river Sindhu i.e. Indus and the Indus valley where the builders of Mohenjodaro and Harappa Civilization appear to have been the earliest settlers. From 2,500 B.C. till 1,250 B.C. this Indus valley civilization continued in its glory. These people are known to have built up an urban civilization, lived in their guarded city states and probably belonged to some branch of the Mediterranean peoples, like our Dravidian peoples of India. They had their own gods and goddesses, the latter being particularly a feature unknown to the Aryans who had come from Eastern Europe via the Iranian plateau to India at a later date i.e. about 1,250 B.C. The seals of Mohenjodaro and Harappa include

among others the sacred images of the *Magna Mator*, the sitting figure of a *yogin* in meditation posture, phallic symbols for fertility cult and twin principles (male and female) of generation, the great bull and the Great God of creation and destruction.

The peoples of Harappa are said to have been ousted by the Aryan nomads who used to come on horseback. These Aryans had mainly a pastoral culture, but were highly organized in life and richly gifted with imagination. In due course they accepted many things of the Harappa culture. They came in waves after waves, and gradually destroyed most of the well-guarded cities of the original settlers of the Indus valley.

According to most scholars similar other non-Aryan peoples lived all over the coun-

try, particularly in the Eastern, Southern and the Himalayan regions of India. There in South they continued to live as the Dravidian people with their own distinct civilization, the civilization of the Dravidas. The conservative Aryans of Northern India had not cared to contact the Dravidas for long. The *Rāmāyaṇa* is supposed to point to this first contact. By first century B.C. the Aryans had also completed adopting many of these Dravidian ideas, ideals and also the idols! In fact, the *Rāmāyaṇa* reveals a picture of such cultural assimilation by the Aryans of certain non-Aryan peoples, viz. Rākṣasas who were evidently very powerful, Niśādas, and some other tribes of Totemic origin. Thus, the Aryan God Indra or Jupiter (Dyupītr) father God of Heaven had been given the title of Purandara or one who had destroyed the fortified cities possibly of the Asuras or those of the Harappa people. The deciphering of Mohenjodaro seals is sure to throw much light on Ancient Indian History, its Religion, Anthropology, Philosophy, Socio-cultural systems and many other similar aspects. The Aryans had their own gods and rituals, like sacrifices, chanting of hymns to nature-gods; prayers for security and physical and moral strength; offerings of animals and their fat to the sacrificial fire etc. The so-called Mohenjodaro people had different gods, we have seen and the Dravidians, a third force, we may say, worshipped their gods with offerings of all sorts of natural objects. Their ritual was *pūjā* (not *yajña*), consisting of different stages, including offering of leaves, water, fruits, and flowers and food etc. Their early religion later developed into the present day cults of Southern India, including Śaivism, Śakti cult, Vaiṣṇava cult, Tantra cult etc. The Aryans were full-blooded people and their inclination was towards a richer and fuller life and enjoyment of everything. The

so-called Dravidians had given India the Bhakti cult in general along with some kind of stoicism and austerity. The Aryan literature of the Veda reveals their original ideas about life and religion. It shows a mixed attachment for both polytheism and monotheism. Of course some veteran scholars are of opinion that Vedic polytheism actually is a kind of disguised monotheism. The monotheistic tendency developed later in the Upaniṣads. This tendency finally was blended with the ideas of South Indian intellectuality and later developed further into a kind of abstract and idealistic Monism.

Gradually the early Aryan settlers moved from Punjab to Eastern and South Eastern parts of India by way of expansion. In due course they spread upto the centre of the Gangetic valley which was very fertile. The word Ganges meant *guṅg* still extant an expression. Originally the word was possibly of Austric origin and meant sweet and perennial water-flow. In these regions the Aryans came in contact with the still earlier settlers, the Austrics or the Eastern people who are mostly today recognized as the Ādivāsīs in India or the Bhūmiputras in Indonesia. These people appear to be the original settlers of the entire Eastern part of the world covered by the Pacific islands, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma and South Eastern part of India. These people were in a way pioneers of a kind of rural culture. They had their plan for cultivating the land and raising crops. The Aryans in India are supposed to owe to these Austrics, the fourth force, we may say the art of rice cultivation, chewing beetle, using turmeric, banana, cocoanut and many other items of fruits, herbs and vegetables without which the religious offerings of a Hindu would not be complete. These Austric people believed in spirits of the dead; had their village medicine men and tribal priests; they had

their totemic gods and fearful taboos or the codes of 'dos' and the 'don'ts'. They had their village folk tales and primitive community dancing and made use of their intoxicating country liquor. They were something more than peaceful; they were rather too flexible and could adopt themselves to any other new force of different environment. This characteristic was useful for them and that is how they still retain their identity even today. Thus, while the Aryans were expanding towards East, these Austric people did not clash much with them. They remained more or less assimilated in the Aryan life and culture. The Eastern countries like Kośala, Magadha, Videha, etc. grew in importance as the places of interest, and the well-co-ordinated Aryan communities were evidently transformed into a composite Hindu society. And hereafter the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, two great epics, became the popular fountain-head of popular Hindu culture and popular Hindu ideals. The so-called Niśādas and the Śavaras slowly and gradually had been taken into the fold of this Hindu society. Their death rituals, animal sacrifices, eating habits, conception of after life and rebirth, local gods and goddesses of totemic and tribal origin had all been accepted as well by the Aryan settlers and all these materials went to make the interwoven design of Hinduism. It is really interesting to find that Great God or Mahādeva of the Hindus is an amalgamation, first of the Aryan God Rudra or the Red God, secondly, of Paśupati or the central Asian God protecting the animals, thirdly, of the sitting *yogin* in meditation posture of Mahenjodaro seal, fourthly, of Śiva or Svayambhū of Dravidian origin, with phallic symbol, fifthly, of the dreadful tribal Chief or village pestilence and evil spirits of the Austries, and, finally, of Mahādeva or Great God, Sadāśiva or ever peaceful and good,

Bholānath or self-forgetting, *Mahāyogin* or meditating for the good of all. Thus Śiva, represents anthropologically the cultural heritage of all these people who are Hindus. So are the other Hindu gods and goddesses, Viṣṇu, Umā etc. And, again, a Hindu hardly knows that while performing the death rituals for his parents he, on the one hand is uttering the hymns from the *Rg-Veda* which may be traced back to 2,000 or 3,000 B.C. and on the other, he is following the traditional customs of his Dravidian heritage while offering food and water and floral offerings to the deity. In offering food to the departed spirit, he follows the way of his Austric ancestors. And at another moment he is also meditating calmly on the Self or Ātman which has also been again coloured by Dravidian and Austric traditional conceptions.

In addition, a Hindu shares practical and objective attitude to life and basic moral qualities which are the typical features of the Kirātas or the Tibeto Mongoloids, the fifth force who settled in the Himalayan regions. Life's plan, according to these people, is well-knit and well co-ordinated. Probably a Hindu has inherited some of the Tāntric practices from the Mohenjodaro people and added to them some Tibetan-Chinese practices, as some scholars would have it. Again, it is this Himalayan region which has given India the Buddha, the Enlightened one who challenged Hinduism which however, did not deny the Buddha.

At a still later date, in the thirteenth century A.D., Muslim conquest of India was almost completed. The Hindus came into contact with a sixth force i.e. Islam. Inter-marriages amongst the Muslim Chiefs and Hindu brides had come to be recognized as a fact by the Hindus. An emperor like Ākbar had thought about a cultural and religious harmony of the many faiths and he tried to put it into practice.

The result of the impact of the Islamic culture could be detected in the mystic literatures of the Sufis and the other Saint-poets of India. A new god was added to the Hindu Pantheon—a 'Satyapīra' who appeared to be a fine amalgamation of the Hindu and Islamic monotheism. In due course, Jesus or Īsā also had come to be known in India first through Saint Thomas who visited India some nineteen hundred years ago. So a seventh force was introduced. Syrian Christians in the South were the early Christian settlers in India and Hindu society had accepted them all in a friendly and neighbourly way. That shows the spirit of the Hindu Religion at its best: Truth is one, it has many facets.

Therefore, while discussing on Hinduism one has got to remember the many coloured background from which this complex pattern of Hinduism has evolved. It is at present one of the most ancient extant religions of the world; its history as we have seen, may be traced to thousands of years or more. It is dynamic and flexible in nature. It is, in spite of glaring contradictions, free of inner conflicts, so much so as to be able to suggest a harmony and solution for all the problems of human life and human mind in the service of the *satyam* (truth) *śivam* (good) *sundaram* (beauty). With simplicity and complexity it looks paradoxical really. There is image-worshipping and no worshipping at all; there is abstract monism existing peacefully with polytheism; unshaken faith and challenging reason are equally prominent. There is conservatism which rigidly guards itself from the external challenges and there is liberal and patient openmindedness with which a Hindu looks forward to the future development of scientifically advanced mankind. There is caste system and there is cosmopolitanism; there is strong emphasis on reason and there is equally a spirit of utter devotion.

So, Ethics, Metaphysics, Religion, Folk-wisdom, social attitude, and individual beliefs are all blended into this one single expression—Hinduism or the Hindu culture.

A Hindu thus rejoices in his proud privilege of having great Vedic and yogic traditions of the past. He rationally discusses the merits and demerits of *jñāna* (reason), *karma* (action) and *bhakti* (devotion) as expounded in the scriptures. He is at times, idealistic in his view of life which is sometime pacifist and again at other times he is dreadfully cruel and fanatic and even primitively tribal. A Hindu is patient and catholic listener to the truths of other religions, for consciously or unconsciously, he remains well-fortified in his inner conviction that he is a Hindu. His worshipping of the images stands for some deep rooted values and his belief in Karma theory and rebirth may be taken either as his preparation for a better life or as a meek and humble acceptance of a stark reality at least gracefully. His religion gives him a strength and a working philosophy; it gives a meaning to his existence and becomes a determining force so far as his station and duties are concerned. His festivals and customs are charming and explain his attitude and responsibility towards the society as a whole. A Hindu defends himself but seldom attacks; a clear-sighted Hindu rejoices in his permanent mooring that he is a Hindu. It is easier for a Hindu to forget angularities through his realization of the maxim '*udāra caritānām tu vasudhaiva kutumbakam*' i.e. only the limited minds think in terms like 'this is my own' and 'the other is not so'; to a liberal minded one the whole universe appears to be his own.

Thus considering the vast background it is very difficult to do justice to the different aspects of Hinduism which has got a

very strange variegated character comparable only to a deep forest or a deep ocean. Nevertheless the canvas as a whole very successfully accommodates various designs which, although outwardly paradoxical, do not become meaningless.

WORDS, MEANINGS AND THINGS

PROFESSOR WILLIAM E. HOOKENS

A lover of words finds endless fun with words, and he rummages through the Dictionary for quaint words even though he does not use them. His love for words and their history is so intense that he will stop at nothing once he has a hold on words. He will go through A.P. Herbert's *What A Word!* and see how people daily make use of words not knowing what they mean, and he wonders how people can understand one another. Ernest Weekley's *Words, Old and New* carries him a step further and shows him the romance in words, and he finds himself in the midst of words of varied meanings and familiar associations. And, like Shelley, he becomes star-dusty with words and, to use the words of the poet and biographer, Francis Thompson, he breaks through the wicket-gates of Fancy! One has only to read Shelley or any great poet to know that words have meanings and thing-values!

Some twenty years ago a Gellet Burges wrote an interesting article on *Words* in *The Christian Monitor* and in *Reader's Digest*, attributing his love for words to an Uncle George who brought with him a Dictionary and studied words as interestedly as an entomologist would study ants. The result was that Gellet, as a child, became curious with words and came to know words like 'malingering', 'secern', 'exiguous' and 'geode' and, though he could not use them in his speech or writing,

he was interested in words as such and, in course of time, increased his vocabulary, using words in the way he liked. As he grew older, he felt a power and confidence that could not be shaken. He became another Grenville Kleiser.

Words by themselves are nothing, and we see this in everyday life where people use words loosely. There is a semblance of good talk and sound meaning but in actual fact it turns out to be a sheer waste of time. There are some who so love the sound of words that they feel the words have a meaning but really such are hollow words. Swinburne used words for the love of the sounds but they had precious little meaning. Sounds by themselves become a jingle unless there is meaning behind them. A person, therefore, who intends to making writing or speaking a beautiful as much as an interesting hobby can do no better than to study words rather than use them with the hope that they might have a meaning somewhere. Words can no more have a meaning by themselves anymore than men can have pig-tails.

No writer or speaker can cover his ignorance by the use of masked words for the after-effect is one of hollowness, of great sound and fury but conveying nothing. There is a painful task at first, namely of making words mean something, and the writer or speaker who wants to make himself clear rubs off all those associations, temporary or permanent, that may attach to

words and uses them in his own way, as William Blake did, and it is such a pleasure reading his poems of Songs and Experience, in words that are simple as they are meaningful. And, like his art-pictures, his poems carry us beyond the realms of meanings and things.

Words are not things to be bandied about, and only he who has had his senses alert will so use words as to convey his meaning of things seen. There was Lord Tennyson who was so observant that he would lie by the stream for hours to get the feel of the stream and things around, and then he would compose poems that show him as an observer first and last. His artistry is apparent in every line he wrote. Words had meanings for him in the things he saw and felt. 'See first, express afterwards' is, therefore, a good warning to all who want to use words well, for only after sound observation can there be sound expression, and without observation there can be no expression. William Wordsworth must have seen, as E. K. Chambers and other critics have told us, a thousand daffodils, and Percy Shelley must have seen a thousand or more skylarks and Robert Browning countless rainbows before they flashed upon the inward eye of the poets and gave rise to their immortal poems. Seeing a thing is not enough, and seeing a thing often has not much value unless the seeing eye urges us to see things further. We get the best of only those things we love. And the more we see them, the more we feel with them and then we use words with a flexibility all their own, with a meaning we want them to have.

Each new word I learn represents the inner world of mind with the outer world of sense, and the more I begin to co-ordinate the two worlds, the greater is my elasticity of expression. I see a bird flying and I want to share this experience with another and so I use the word 'bird' which

represents the 'thing', with the use of the word-movement 'flying' to indicate a visual experience, and I am satisfied that I have said the thing I wanted to say or in other words I have carried my message across as Elbert Hubbard carried 'A Message to Garcia' through sheer initiative. Words are not to be found with ease and the man who loved to dig for words, as men dig for diamonds or gold, was John Ruskin whose essay on 'Sesame and Lillies' is worth reading to know how the great stylists, among whom number Walter Pater and Robert Louis Stevenson, brought to words the charm of life, investing in mere words both meanings and things.

But this is not possible with all experiences and the more complicated they are, the greater is the difficulty in fitting them with words of a satisfying nature. We see this difficulty in the metaphysical-poet John Donne and in the Jesuit-poet G. M. Hopkins particularly. And yet words are coiled to meaning to give us the thing that becomes all the more elusive and then there is a dimming of the meaning to bring out the thing in a shadowy outlines, as it were! More so is this the case with a sensitive writer who is so flooded with images of a varied kind that he fails to manage them in art's way, realizing as he does the rigidity of the words themselves and the fluidity of the experience as such. As C. E. Montague says in *A Writer's Notes on his Trade*: 'The harder a writer tries to add beauty to clearness, the more surely does he feel himself to be held off from perfection by attributes of language which he did not make and cannot do away with.'

This difficulty is particularly experienced when we use words as words and fail to coalesce them with thing—meaningness. The more we are absorbed in the thing itself, the greater is the grasp and control over words. For what are words but the

coverings of things seen, felt or heard? And a ready-made set of words will not fit a new experience any more than a ready-made name will fit a newly born child. Sensible parents name the child after seeing it and try to fit the name to the child rather than the other way about. Much as we love words, the feel and sound of words, they can convey nothing by themselves nor can they reveal an experience which is foreign to them. So words are said to clothe the experience and this is only by way of approximation; and it is only the poet or the man with a feel for words and sound-meaning that brings to his poems or to his prose compositions the nearness to the thing itself. And yet there is no understanding it because words as words have, what I. A. Richards would call 'stock responses', 'Mnemonic irrelevances', etc., and one sees this when one goes through *The Seven Types of Ambiguity* by William Empson who, as a poet knew the elusiveness of meaning and the waywardness of words. This Cambridge-man with his beard that has become a part of him had much to say of poetry and its elusiveness (and here lies the perennial charm of poetry) at the University of Manchester ten years ago. The more we live in a world of things, the more we see the difficulty of rounding off our experiences in well-chosen words; and it is this inability to get at the meaning of things that makes us live and experiment in verse or prose, in painting or in sculpture to express the things we see and feel. We often find in the heat of the moment that the words have eluded us and some other words have taken their place and we are mad with rage. When will words follow us? We calm down and think anew and use words again but they limp. We give up writing and then, one day, the words come tripping . . . and we write like one who is inspired . . . and lo! it is a mira-

cle of expression—almost like the immortal lines of Coleridge in 'Kubla Khan' or of John Keats in 'Endymion'. There is no laying down the rule when it comes to words. All that one can do is to soak oneself in the best literature and let the deep speak to the deep!

There are some writers like Thomas Hardy and others who write simply and clearly and the words are not elusive. In fact, the words are so chiselled as to fit in with the piece, the architect that Hardy was by profession. Others, like Somerset Maugham had no time for obscurity in any form and in his book the *Summing Up*, he said: 'I have never had patience with the writers who claim from the reader an effort to understanding their meaning. You have to go to the philosophers to see that it is possible to express with lucidity the most subtle experiences.' And he continued: 'You may find it difficult to understand the thought of Hume, and if you have no philosophical training its implication will doubtless escape you, but no one with any education at all can fail to understand exactly what the meaning of each sentence is.'

Here we come into conflict with 'meaning' and 'things', both of which are different, and a knowledge of the one will not lead to the knowledge of the other. This can be readily seen from the reading of poetry. One reads a poetry-passage five times over and yet fails to grasp the passage, although one understands the meaning of each sentence. There is another who, reads the same passage once and lo! grasps it and reads it over and over again for the thrill of sound-meaning and for the mood of sheer elation it generates! To know the 'meaning' of a passage does not mean to understand it, except in the prose-sense of the word. We know of those who try to paraphrase and fail to grasp the passage as a whole, seeing

as they do the meaning of sentences in parts. Little do they know that they are strangers to the word-meaningness of things and fail to go past the representational value of words. For them there is no hope except through the development of the mind—and the bigger and the more flexible the mind, the better is it fitted for the use of words to convey the world of things. Shakespeare and Milton are familiar example of those who used words to convey the mighty and the small, the varied and the familiar in words that can never die.

Yet when all is said and done, words are not last things in life and at best convey only a fraction of the things we want. Words are maddening tools and the more we use them the more we feel that words have got us nowhere. The essayist, stylist and novelist Virginia Woolf failed to express the inexpressible and what she expressed was only an apology to what she wanted to express. She got caught in the meshes of words and died a suicidal. Rabindranath Tagore whom the contemporary world praised so much, felt his life was futile and that all his books were far

short of the things he wanted to express. And he observed a stony silence afterwards! Yet both Woolf and Tagore were stylists of a high order.

The study of semantics sheds a good deal of light on words, but semantics by itself will mean nothing if behind the words there is not the divine grasp of life. The fact that we use words and think that we are masters of words should not make us conceited, for words are no indication of the meaning or the thing. There are, indeed, great gaps in our knowledge which have to be bridged to strengthen ourselves. Words are symbols and the symbolic thing is not easy of grasp. Our failure to grasp and combine symbol and sign in a way that will make interpretation complete and satisfying accounts for most of our dissatisfaction. The best passages of the great stylists reveal an inner urge for expression combined with a beauty and depth that no mortals dare to aspire. They are the passages that cry aloud to be memorized, and one such passage is the opening lines in St. John's Gospel: 'In the beginning was the Word and the Word was made Flesh.'

SĀMKHYA AND ADVAITA VEDĀNTA (ON SELF-LUMINOSITY OF KNOWLEDGE)

DR. ANIMA SENGUPTA

Both Sāmkhya and the Advaita Vedānta admit a difference between pure consciousness (*śuddha caitanya*) and phenomenal knowledge (*vṛttijñāna*). Pure consciousness is self-revealing, eternal and devoid of all relations to *buddhi* or *antaḥkaraṇa*. It is devoid of qualities, devoid of difference, devoid of change and devoid of attachment. According to the Sāmkhya,

this pure consciousness is different from the intellectual understanding of Puruṣa and Prakṛti as two—an understanding which is a disposition (*dharma*) of the *buddhi*. According to Advaita Vedānta also, the *Brahmākārā vṛtti* or *nivartaka jñāna* is a *dharma* of *antaḥkaraṇa* and as such it is other than Brahman and is false and destructible.

Now, in the state of bondage, pure consciousness is never revealed to us in its true form (i.e., in the form in which pure consciousness is devoid of all relations to *buddhi* and its *vṛttis*). A bound soul is aware only of the *viśayākārā vṛtti* which is intelligized by consciousness (*Caitanya sambalita vṛtti prakāśa*); and the manifestation of the object through *vṛtti* is the sign of the existence of the object. We can become conscious of the existence of an object only when it is related to knowledge or consciousness. The object which never gets revealed in knowledge is not admitted as existent, for example, the son of a barren woman. Whenever we know an object, we know it as real; its intelligibility is the proof of its existence. Nobody can question the existence of an object when he is having a knowledge of it.

Here the critic might ask: granted that the knowledge of an object is the proof of its existence; but how can the existence of knowledge be proved? Do we know that we are having the knowledge of an object? We cannot say that there should be another knowledge to make the first knowledge known to us, because in that case, there ought to be an infinite number of knowledge which will lead us only to infinity. In other words, there will be the fallacy of infinite regress. Hence, according to Advaita Vedānta and also according to Sāmkhya, knowledge is simultaneously revealed along with the object of knowledge. Knowledge reveals the object and also itself at the same time without the help of any other knowledge. This is what is called self-revealing nature of knowledge. According to Sāmkhya-yoga this is *sadāñātāścittavṛttya yasta prabhoh puruṣasyāpariṇāmitvāt* (IV. 18). That is to say that the revelation of the object takes place simultaneously with the *viśaya-viśayakacitta vṛtti* (mental mode relating to the object). The Advaita Vedānta,

too, holds, that the object and the knowledge are cognized at the same time, because consciousness conditioned by the *vṛtti* of the form of the object (*viśayākārā-vṛttyavacchinna caitanya*) reveals the object. Since, Puruṣa, according to Sāmkhya, is mere revealing consciousness, no other revealing consciousness can be logically accepted as the revealer of the revealing consciousness. (*Tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvaṁ tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti*) Hence, Puruṣa is *svaprakāśa*.

If self-luminosity of cognition had not been a fact then at the time when the object is known, the knower would have doubted if he had any knowledge at that time or not. When a man knows an object, he is sure about his own knowledge that he has seen the object and never doubts it. Knowledge is always known directly but the object is known only when it is related to knowledge. We cannot argue that one cognition is revealed by another cognition, because in that case, there will be the fallacy of infinite regress. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary for us to admit that when an object is revealed by a cognition, the cognition is revealed as well.

Citsukhācārya has defined self-luminosity of knowledge as '*avedyatve sati aparokṣa vyavahārayogyatvam*'. Although *avedya*, still it possesses the capacity of being known directly by itself. An unconscious object, such as a jar, does not possess this capacity, because a jar is always revealed in knowledge. This definition will cover the state of liberation as well. This is because the state of liberation is not the locus of the *atyantābhāva* of *yogyatā*. (*aparokṣa vyavahārayogyatātyantābhāvānadhikaranatvam*) being the locus of its *dharma-sābhāva*. The substance is defined in the Nyāya Philosophy as '*gunavot dravyam*'. Here, also, we find that in the very first moment, there is only the substance devoid of quali-

ties. Even then, this state of the substance is covered by the definition, since this state is not the locus of the *atyantābhāva* of qualities, (*anadhikarana* of the *atyantābhāva* of the quality)

Again, according to Nṛsiṃhāsrama Muni, self-luminosity should be defined as '*samvidaviṣayatvam*'. Consciousness is one. So, we cannot say that one consciousness becomes the object of another consciousness. If it is urged that consciousness becomes its own object as well, then this position also cannot be logically justified. One and the same thing cannot be both the revealer and the revealed at the same time. (The sky-flower is an *aviṣaya* of *samvit*; but as the sky-flower is non-existent or *tuccha*, it can never become a matter for philosophical consideration.)

Consciousness, being consciousness, is self-revealing. That which is not consciousness is not self-revealing, as for example, the jar. One may pose a question: how do you know that the self is of the nature of consciousness? Unless that is proved, the self cannot be regarded as self-revealing although consciousness has been proved to be self-luminous. Here, the reply is: according to the śruti, the self is of the nature of consciousness (*cidrūpa*)—'*Vijñānam ānandam Brahma*' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III. ix. 34), '*Prajñānaghana eva*' (*ibid.*, IV. v. 16). The śruti has described the soul as both self-revealing and of the form of consciousness—(*atrāyam puruṣaḥ svayam jyotiḥ*). In the opinion of the śruti, it is the soul which possesses the power of self-luminosity being *cidrūpa* in nature. That which is different from consciousness is always revealed as the object of consciousness, as for example such things as, the jar, the cloth, the chair etc. That which is not revealed as the object of consciousness, is not different from con-

sciousness. The soul is never revealed as the object of consciousness and so the soul is not different from consciousness. In *Ātma-sākṣātkāra*, that which is revealed as the object of consciousness is nothing but the *Ātmākārā vṛtti*. Hence, the soul, being the *aviṣaya* of *samvit*, is of the nature of *samvit* and is also self-luminous.

The critic, here, may raise an objection by saying that the sky-flower too, never becomes an object of knowledge. Hence, according to this definition of self-luminosity, the sky-flower also must be regarded as self-luminous. This objection, however, is not very sound. The sky-flower is non-existent (*tuccha*) and regarding a non-existent object, the question of *svaprakāśatva* or *paraprakāśatva* does not arise.

In the Sāṃkhya Philosophy, on the other hand we do not come across any detailed discussion regarding the self-luminosity of consciousness. Naturally, therefore, no definition of self-luminosity is found in the Sāṃkhya texts; but if we consider the *Kārikā* No. 11, we find that Prakṛti has been described there as *triguṇa viṣaya* and *acetana* whereas Puruṣa has been supposed to have the opposite characteristics, that is to say that Puruṣa or consciousness is *atriguṇa*, *aviṣaya* and *cetana*.

If Puruṣa is *cetana*, it is also *ajaḍa*; and if it is *ajaḍa*, it is not *paraprakāśya*. That which is revealed by something other than itself, is to be regarded as *jaḍa*. Now, if Puruṣa, being *ajaḍa*, is not dependent on anything else for its revelation, then it should be regarded as self-luminous by nature, because self-luminosity of a *tattva* means that it is not revealed by anything other than itself. Consciousness is also revealed directly, (*aparokṣa vyavahāra*). In the case of the intellectual mode of a jar, consciousness is reflected in the mode, but in the case of the *caitanyākārā vṛtti*, no further reflection of consciousness is necessary. Consciousness is revealed directly.

Hence, we can say that according to Sāṃkhya, the definition of self-luminosity will be as follows :

'Samvidaviṣayatve sati

aparokṣa vyavahāra योगyatvam.'

Further, in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, the existence of Puruṣa has been established by inference. This may give one the impression that Puruṣa is to be known only indirectly. This, however, is not the real implication of the fact of proving the existence of Puruṣa by inference. That there is something over and above the

jadaviṣaya in knowledge is experienced immediately; what we prove by inference, is only the fact that this something is different from the jada object.

Non-objectivity (*aviṣayatva*) too follows from the Kārikā No. 11, because Prakṛti has been described as *viṣaya*. Puruṣa, being opposed to Prakṛti in this respect, must be non-objective in nature. Thus the Advaita definition of self-luminosity may be utilized satisfactorily to explain the self-luminous character of Puruṣa.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

IN THIS NUMBER

P. S. Sastri, M.A., M.Litt., Ph.D., is the Head of the Post-Graduate Department of English in the Nagpur University. Dr. Sastri presents a scholarly analysis on 'Nature of Difference'.

P. Nagaraja Rao M.A., D.Litt., formerly Professor of Philosophy in Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati, makes a brief review on 'The Religion of Devotion' as described in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*.

S. P. Sen Gupta M.A., Ph.D. (London) is the Head of the Department of English in the University of North Bengal, West Bengal. With a style and penetration of his own Dr. Sen Gupta begins here the first section of his article 'Vivekananda The Wit—I', a subject that renews our interest on the life and teachings of Swami Vivekananda.

(Mrs.) Aruna Halder M.A., Ph.D. (C. U.), Reader (P. U.) is the Head of the Department of philosophy, Women's College, Patna. She was formerly the Professor of Indian Philosophy, Sanskrit and Bengali in the Oriental Faculty of Leningrad University, U.S.S.R. Dr. Halder's present article on 'Hinduism' bespeaks her wide scholarship.

Professor William E. Hookens, Head of the Department of English, Sri Nīlkanteswar Govt. Post-Graduate College, Khandwa presents an illuminating discussion on 'Words, Meanings and Things'.

(Miss) Anima Sengupta, M.A., Ph.D., Reader in Philosophy, Patna University, Bihar, compares the views of Sāṃkhya with those of Vedānta on the question of the self-luminosity of knowledge

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

TOWARD ENLIGHTENED LIFE. BY SWAMI P. PARAMPANTHI. 'Viraj', Dibrugarh, Assam, India, 1965. Pages 205. Price Rs. 5.

The book is divided into two Books with four chapters in Book-I and seven chapters in Book-II. A few famous teachers and systems have been discussed in Book-I and the practical problems of meditation and living have been dealt in Book-II.

The book was written mostly in America and the author's acknowledgements are mostly to American citizens and he rightly maintains that 'the book has an international background'. That spirit and liberality of outlook has been maintained throughout. Like other works of Indo-American collaboration the book is very well prepared.

Contrary to what one may be tempted to think the book is not only useful to those seeking spiritual progress, it is equally useful to men and women in every walk of life. Particularly the chapter on 'Creative Living', we think, is specially useful to younger persons who have the greatest need to plan their living if they must achieve something in life.

DR. P. N. MUKHERJEE

ZOROASTER'S INFLUENCE ON GREEK THOUGHT. BY RUHI MUHSEN AFNAN. Philosophical Library, INC. 15th East 40th Street, New York 16, N.Y., 1965. Pages 436. Price \$7.50.

The book with a very lucid 'Introduction', eleven chapters on The Milesian School, Orphic and Pythagorean Mysticism, the Eleatic School, Heraclitus, Protagoras, Socrates, five chapters on Plato and his thought and detailed reference is certainly a useful addition to our knowledge of Zoroaster. Zoroaster who thrived in the fifth century B.C., was a contemporary of the Greek thinkers and of Buddha and Mahāvīra. They were equally faced with the problem of cultural vacuum. Greek remedy to this vacuum was dialectic, rationalistic and humanistic; whereas the Zoroastrian remedy was divine and in the nature of a revelation. Mr. Afnan insists that the need of the hour then was not dialectics but something superior to that, namely divine and revelational. This was the Zoroastrian approach. The author maintains with great insight that the two views were, however, not really competitive. Rather they were complementary.

The reader will find much information, knowledge and even wisdom in the pages of this book.

But a detailed Index and a chapter on Zoroaster are lacking. If these are incorporated in future editions it shall be a really very valuable work. The author deserves congratulations for such a valuable work.

DR. P. N. MUKHERJEE

RAMBLES IN ADVAITA (ILLUSTRATED). BY H. H. SRI VIMALANANDA NRUSIMHA BHARATI SWAMY. Gudivada, Dt. Krishna, A.P. Pages xxiv+ 146. Price Rs. 2.50.

Despite the printer's devils bristling on every page the book may be taken as a learned as well as a simple introduction to Advaita.

The book consists in all of 18 chapters. The 17th of it is quite irrelevant to the subject. The 18th Ch. titled 'Hints for Advaita Siddhi' is not practical, but is made up of definitions of some Vedāntic terms here and there but mostly of topics dealt with in the rest of the chapters.

The book can be roughly divided into two parts, the first covering chaps. 1-15, inclusive of the author's appreciation of Śrī Śaṅkara and Sri Ramana Maharshi and the second part, consisting solely of Ch. 16 which is concerned with the worship of deities like Gaṇapati, śaṇmukha, Saraswatī, Lakṣmī, Durgā, Kālī, Śiva etc. and the symbolic description of weapons and ornaments on their persons. This second part means that one must rise stage by stage from the concrete to the abstract for realization. It may be remarked that the learned author's explanation of the symbolism is not quite in consonance with the anthropomorphic explanation of our ancient *Śāstras*, which are truly based upon the Vedic and the Upaniṣadic traditions. According to the author, the aim of astrology is not only to help man to acquire earthly felicities but also to develop his spiritual personality. The highlights of the book are Chs: 3, (The Mystery of the Universe), 9 (Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad), Ch. 11 (The Three Ls. Logos, Light, and Life), Ch. 12 (Ten Practical Steps to Divinity). In the learned author's advaitic regard there is nothing like death; it is but a change of bodily vesture in reincarnation: there is death only when the finite self (*jīva*) is absolved in the Super-Self at its realization as such, when death amounts to the simple shedding of all finite nature.

Though not a consistent thesis on Advaita, the book would still be useful to a spiritual aspirant.

P. SAMA RAO

WITH ROBES AND BOWL: GLIMPSES OF THE THUDONG BHIKKU LIFE (ILLUSTRATED). BY BHIKKU KANTIPALO. Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Ceylon. Pages 76. Price 50 Cents.

This precious little book deals with the wandering life of a typical wandering *Bhikkhu* as a spiritual preparation for the achievement of '*Nibbāna*', based upon the monastic injunctions laid by Lord Buddha in his various Discourses reported in ancient Pāli texts such as *Dhammapada*, *Sutta Nipāta*, *Ariyavamsa Sutta* (*Aliyavāsini Sutta* of Aśoka dealing with The Noble Lineage), *Milinda-panha* etc. The thirteen Precepts relating to the austere practices, allowed by Lord Buddha for purposes of training *Bhikkhus* in virtues of contentment, humility, continence, harmlessness, compassion, 'mindfulness', abnegation of luxuries and non-essentials, tranquillity, equipoise, restraint, ever-wakefulness, activity etc. in order that they may rid themselves of the three roots of Greed, Hatred, and Delusion, although find mention as ascetic exercises, in the 'old *Sutta* texts but never in one and the same place'. These practices vary from place to place only in non-essentials dependent upon the natural facilities therein. Contentment broadly lies in the acceptance of tattered robes, indifferent alms-food, and forest-retreats away from the madding crowds in nonchalant cheer.

The book provides in an interesting and instructive manner the details of the daily routine of *Bhikkhu's* life, all of which are calculated to educate him into the avoidance of the transitoriness of the world and focus his all-attention at all hours on the achievement of '*Nibbāna*', the eternal panacea for all ills.

The book is a precious must for all aspirants irrespective of whether they belong to the Buddhist persuasion or not.

P. SAMA RAO

THE IDEAL OF CULTURE IN THE RĀMĀ-YANA (VOL. I) — THE THREE STAGES OF YOGA BY HIS HOLINESS JAINACHARYA SRIMAD VIJAY RAMCHANDRA SURISHWARJI MAHARAJ. Chunilal V. Mody, 233 A Shroff Bazar, Bombay-2, 1965. Pages 235. Price Rs. 5.00.

This book is the English version of the spiritual discourses given in 1951 in Gujarati by His Holiness Surishwarji, the reputed Svetāmbara Jain saint. His Holiness has the art of pin-pointing his audience's attention to the subject-matter. These discourses will lead the reader to a clear conception of the fundamentals of spiritual life.

His Holiness has discussed the three stages of

yoga in a descending order dealing with the stages of renunciation and detachment as embodied in the *Rāmāyana*.

The book has an attractive get-up. Keeping the wider world in view, this English version, should be made more abridged.

SWAMI MITRANANDA

INDUSTRIALIZE—AND PERISH! BY M. K. GANDHI. Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad-14. 1966. Pages 120. Price Rs. 2.50

This booklet compiled by Sri R. K. Prabhu contains Gandhiji's statements right back from 1916 till his end on industrialization and urbanization. The statements, while they are highly controversial, deserve re-study under the present contexts.

According to Gandhiji 'it is absurd to say that India is overpopulated. If all the available land was properly utilized and made to yield upto its capacity it would surely maintain the whole population'. (p. 34) 'If all laboured for their bread, and no more, then there would be enough food and enough leisure for all. Then there would be no cry of overpopulation.' (p. 107) He said, 'I would have our leaders teach us to be morally supreme in the world.' (p. 13) His view that 'the evils are inherent in industrialism, and no amount of socialization can eradicate them.' (p. 32) was based on what was prevalent in almost all the countries. He took the socialistic ways of production and distribution for the benefit of masses to be new experiments and could not approve of any such method 'as it is based on force'. However he has never been dogmatic in his views. He boldly says, 'In my search after truth I have discarded many ideas and learnt many new things.'

In general he was against unbalanced industrialization. He forewarned the country 'I see coming the day of the rule of the poor, whether that rule be through force of arms or of non-violence. ... A violent and bloody revolution is a certainty one day unless there is a voluntary abdication of riches and the power that riches give and sharing them for the common good.' (pp. 86, 88) The views, since those have been expressed by a person like Gandhiji, need further careful elaboration and assessment and we hope the publishers will take up the job.

SWAMI MITRANANDA

A SHORT LIFE OF NICOLAI SCHEIERMAN. BY DR. V. V. ATHALYE. Saraswati Sadan, Satara (Maharashtra). 1965. Pages 92. Price Rs. 5.00 or 10 sh.

As to coming civilization or cultural prototype many social philosophers of the West such as Danilevsky, Spengler, Toynbee, Schubart foresee that it will be Religiously-Ideational, basically different from that which has been dominant during the last four or five centuries. Mr. Nicolai Scheierman is one of those who are paving the way for that. A Russian, born in 1869, Mr. Nicolai has been attempting to lead a spiritual life on a community basis. He is experimenting with 'Brotherhood of a New Order of Life'. He identifies 'Life' with Truth, Love or God and sees God in all that exists, as completely in the least fragment as in whole cosmos. (p. 12) His ideas are fully Vedāntic and he is trying to socialize them. His unswerving faith in principles even in trying circumstances at this ripe old age is an inspiration to others.

Dr. Athalye should be thanked that he is making Mr. Nicolai Scheierman and his experiments known to this country. In this short volume he aptly describes Mr. Nicolai's experiments, faith and tenets of the philosophy of life. His conceptions about good and evil, reason and heart, crime and punishment, spirituality, organization and parliamentary system etc. are in line with those of other great thinkers.

The book is thought-provoking.

SWAMI MITRANANDA

ANAGARIKA DHARMAPALA. By BHIKSHU SANGHARAKSHITA. Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Ceylon. 1964 (Third Edition). Pages 98.

This biographical sketch, the present edition, is in commemoration of the Birth Centenary of Anagarika Dharmapala who by dint of his perseverance, sincerity and devotion to the cause of Buddhists rose to great eminence. His struggle for the cause should be a source of encouragement. In Ceylon itself Buddhism was dwindling at the time and Dharmapala's contribution to forestall that was immense. His speeches at the Parliament of Religions at Chicago and in other platforms served the cause of the Buddhists. Founding of Mahabodhi Society is a landmark in his mission.

The sketch however suffers from certain deficiencies. Adverse remarks on Hinduism here and there do not speak well of it. In the way of depicting Dharmapala others have been wrongly assessed. Swami Vivekananda, the illustrious contemporary of Dharmapala spoke from many platforms about Lord Buddha and Buddhism. But those find no recognition in this book. Inclusion of some of the speeches and writings of Dharmapala

in the book would have presented the views properly.

SWAMI MITRANANDA

DEVOTIONAL OUTBURSTS IN VERSES. By GANESH CHANDRA SENGUPTA. Monoranjan Sen, 65/64 Motimohal, Kanpur, U.P. Pages 28. Price 75 paise.

The author Sri Ganesh Chandra Sengupta, a sightless octogenarian educationist, and a retired Headmaster, hailing from Dacca, now in the East Pakistan, is very popular and has students spread all over India.

The booklet is the outcome of the stemming of the spiritual fervour of the author, which is now the outstanding feature of his life. It is hoped that the readers in general will find ideas of abiding interest and spiritual delight from its perusal.

SRI JATINDRA NATH MUKHERJEE

PILGRIM'S TRAVEL GUIDE (PART II). By SRI V. R. RAGAM. TRANSLATED FROM TELUGU. S.S.R.N.S. Sangam Guntur. 1963. Pages 488. Price Rs. 6.50.

This beautifully illustrated and neatly got-up volume sets out description and significance of a number of historical and spiritual centres of India roughly located in the 'North and Himalayan regions'. The author relies upon the Purāṇic and other sources for spiritual significance. Much of the information given is pertinent, adequate, interesting and instructive.

The appendices cover lists of choultries or *dharmaśālās* at various centres of pilgrimage, the nearest and the most convenient routes to reach them, their Railway and bus-fares, conveniences and comforts provided therein, and tour-maps, etc., which all afford the traveller the 'Know-How' to complete the pilgrimage.

P. SAMA RAO

THE WAY OF THE WHITE CLOUDS. By LAMA ANAGARIKA GOVINDA. Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., London. 1966. Pages 305. Price 50 sh. net.

Santaraksita and Padmasambhava transformed Tibet into a land devoted to Buddhism. Since then Tibet became an important centre of Buddhist mysticism. The chief glory of the land has been the living emphasis on meditation and other yogic practices. Along with this, the land of colours became a paradise of painters and artists. In overrunning the Tibetan mainland, the Chinese sought to crush the living soul of the people there,

But they do not appear to accept the fact that the soul is capable of overpowering the weak body. The flesh is weak and the spirit is willing; and so the Tibetans endeavour to preserve their heritage.

Lama Anagarika Govinda, 'an Indian national of European descent and Buddhist faith, belonging to a Tibetan order and believing in the Brotherhood of Man', presents an illuminating picture of the land of the white clouds. The work is in five parts. In the first, he takes us through his travels in Tibet and incidentally presents a brilliant account of the *guru-celā* relationship. The affectionate Kachenla led him to his great *guru* Tomo Geshe Rimpoche. Here we come across the author's great insight into the meaning of initiation, and his understanding of the spiritual vision. The account is interspersed with brilliant remarks on Tibetan music, *Lung-Gom* and trance-waking, the life of the recluses, and on the conquest of death. The incidents gathered here are all from the author's own experiences.

The author looks at Tibet as a mystic, as a Buddhist devotee, and as a painter. In a way the work is the author's spiritual and aesthetic autobiography. This self-examination is an important step in the soul's quest for self-realization and enlightenment.

The work repays a close study.

DR. P. S. SASTRI

SANSKRIT-ENGLISH

KAVI-KAUMUDĪ OF KALYA LAKṢMĪ NṚSIMHA. (TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH VERSES). BY DR. K. KRISHNAMURTI. Karnatak University, Dharwar. 1965. Pages 64. Price Rs. 1.50.

This is an anthology of *anyokti* verses by Kalya Lakṣmī Nṛsimha (1700-1800), who is no less noted in Sanskrit light verse, than his father, a learned poet and author of *Sāhitya Makaranda* and *Alaṅkāra cintāmaṇi*. His great grandfather Narasimha seems to be a great grammarian and the author of *Prakriyā Kalpa vallarī*. It is therefore no surprise to find these *anyoktis* in diverse metres with melodious words, all strung together with masterly technique and spontaneous flow, highly suggestive of the contents so variegated and allegoric too (I. 99; II. 28, 42, 46) in many an instance. The subject-matter ranges from the symptomatic fauna to the flora, birds, gods, nature, etc. and in no particular order of treatment. In every case the description of the item is significantly natural and symbolic of the sublime, the grotesque, the un-

grateful and envious conduct of the human. Thus the poet's *anyoktis* are sublime, satiric and ironic (I. 97, 98, 100, 101; II. 3, 4, 6), and appreciative too by turns dependent upon the poet's didactic purpose in view. Each is a luscious pen-vignette.

The learned translator has given in his precious Introduction some salient features of the poet's life and art, and has justly placed him in the front rank of the poets of light verses.

The book is of two cantos, the first a full century and the second an incomplete one of only forty-six verses translated and eight additional ones untranslated but supplied to the editor by Sri Paremeswara Aithal of the Adyar Library. Noting the high quality of the additional ones we very much wish the author had rendered them too into English verse with the same gusto he had done the rest. This is in short about the original which has been printed too in Devanagari type in order to help a just appreciation of the original.

Some of the verses as they appear have not been adequately brought out in proper English phraseology in the translation (I. 57-61, 63, 70, 89; II. 6, 12, 33, 34). Some of the renderings could be improved for clarity (I. 5, 71; II. 12 etc.) The translation is not however without sublime and sonorous passages (I. 12, 19, 36-49; II. 2, 3, 27, 29, 39, 46).

Barring these, that may be called deficiencies, the overall picture of the translation is a fair one and gives a pretty good sense of the original. The translator has to be congratulated for bringing out this anthology of luscious nature-poetry. The price is low for the precious contents and neat get-up.

P. SAMA RAO

PANCAĀṢĪ (ENGLISH TRANSLATION). BY SWAMI SWAHANANDA. Sri Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, Madras-4. 1967. Pages 618. Price: Board Rs. 9.50, Calico Rs. 11.00.

Śrī Vidyāranya, the saint-philosopher-statesman of the fourteenth century, was one of the greatest scholars after Śrī Śaṅkara. A firm believer in the Advaita Vedānta, he sought to harmonize the different post-Śaṅkara schools in his works like *Vārtika Sāra*, *Jīvanmukti Viveka*, and *Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha*. Accepting the framework of the Vivaraṇa school of Advaita Vedānta, he developed the doctrine systematically. Of all his works the most popular one is the *Pañcadaśī*, a treatise in fifteen chapters. Each chapter is a lamp leading the student gradually to the Absolute Brahman which is *Svayam Jyotiḥ*.

The first five chapters (*Vivekapañcaka*) enable us to distinguish the real from the non-real. The next five chapters (*Dīpapañcaka*) reveal the self as pure consciousness. The last five (*Ānandapañcaka*) speak of Brahman. The work is an indispensable introduction to the system. Vidyāranya is not interested here in exhibiting his logical or dialectical acumen. He is concerned with Śruti, not with *Kūṭatarka*. As against Prakāśātman's interpretation of Pratibimbavāda, he goes back to Sureśvara's Ābhāsavāda and harmonizes the different views.

This great work has been available to us in the original and in a few renderings in the Indian languages. It is our good fortune that the Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras, succeeded in getting an English translation from Swami Swahananda. The Swami has given a free and idiomatic rendering, not a literal translation. Thus '*śūnyatvam tasya durghatam*' is beautifully rendered as 'non-existence cannot be attributed to it'. The notes

accompanying some of the verses are illuminating and stimulating.

The present text is a must for every student of philosophy. More particularly today when philosophy is reduced to the level of an episode in linguistics or to the level of an anguished cry, works like this would certainly revive real interest in metaphysics and epistemology.

DR. P. S. SASTRI.

BENGALI

ŚISUDER SWĀMIJĪ. BY SRI RAMEN SARKER. Ramakrishna Mission Ashrama, Narendrapur, 24 Parganas. 1963. Pages 35. Price 0.85 paise.

In Bengali, children's literature, is yet at a formative stage. Lives of great men, when presented in due form, carry lasting impression on the children. In that respect the book is a valuable addition in this sphere.

SWAMI MITRANANDA

NEWS AND REPORTS

THE VEDANTA CENTRE, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

REPORT OF ACTIVITIES FOR 1965-66

As in previous years the Swami was invited by the Faculty of Letters, University of Geneva to deliver a series of lectures on the Religions of India. These lectures illustrated by slides were largely attended. The regular discourses on the *Gītā* given at the Swami's residence were continued as an essential feature.

In February '66 the National Church of Switzerland requested the Swami to speak to the pasteurs on 'Hinduism: Its Religious and Psychological Aspects'. In April invited by the International Centre of Oecumenical Studies, Rome the Swami delivered two lectures to the alumni of the Centre on Jainism and Buddhism. An extensive report of the two talks appeared in the Oecumenical Centre's report.

During the year under report the Geneva Centre brought out the *Science of Yoga*, published by the Paris Editors, Maisonneuve et Larose, this being the fourth publication of the Swami in French. During the month of May the Centre organized at St. Moritz with the active collaboration of Mr.

Wolfram H. Koch a spiritual Retreat for aspirants. During September another Retreat of the same type was organized near St. Gallen, Switzerland.

SISTER NIVEDITA BIRTH CENTENARY CELEBRATION

The Birth centenary of Sister Nivedita (1867-1911) will be celebrated by the Nivedita School Centenary Committee (5 Nivedita Lane, Calcutta 3) between October 1967 and October 1968 in Calcutta and other places. Besides bringing out various publications which include the complete works of Sister Nivedita in four volumes, the Committee has drawn up an elaborate programme of cultural functions, public meetings, sectional conferences, and exhibitions, etc. Effort will also be made to create a substantial Education Fund for helping poor and meritorious students. The Centenary celebrations will be inaugurated in Calcutta on October 28, 1967 with special *Pūjā* in the Nivedita School shrine in the morning and a public meeting at Mahajati Sadan in the evening. The meeting will be presided over by Srimat Swami Vireswaranandaji Maharaj, President of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission.